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KICKSTARTER MY HEART: EXTRAORDINARY 
POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF 
CROWDFUNDING CONSTRAINTS AND BITCOIN 
BUBBLES 
DAVID GROSHOFF* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article builds on my existing research program that (a) broadly 
seeks to analyze laws, regulations, instruments, and policy levers that inhib-
it a market’s ability to recognize an asset’s intrinsic value, whether in terms 
of financial, social, or human capital, and (b) explores and advances inter-
disciplinary corporate governance theories by employing a heterodox eco-
nomic analytic to derive its proposal to the paradox of an unregulated vir-
tual currency market (Bitcoins) and an overly regulated crowdfunding 
market (Kickstarter). 
The Article functions not only as an homage to Charles MacKay’s leg-
endary 1841 book, Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of 
Crowds, which described the human, social, and economic psychology of 
financial bubbles—particularly the Dutch tulip bulb bubble—but also as 
an offering of problems and proposals that crowdfunded and Kickstarted 
entrepreneurial businesses, including those funded by Bitcoin currencies, 
present for a wide swath of societal stakeholders. 
To describe the problem, this Article (i) describes behavioral finance, 
(ii) details the new entrepreneurial business possibilities that virtual cur-
rencies and crowdfunded entities can explore, (iii) describes how current 
rules and regulations represent unnecessary constraints to traditional 
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equity-based funding models and concerning governance models of entre-
preneurial enterprises, and (iv) questions why one form of capital deploy-
ment (currencies) may provide equity-like returns and unique governance, 
while the other form of investing (crowdfunding), provides only soft-
dollar-like returns and no governance for middle-class investors. While 
both virtual currencies and crowdfunding represent risks, including eco-
nomic bubble risk, this Article believes that a heterodox economic analysis 
demonstrates unnecessary constraints on entrepreneurial businesses im-
posed by extant regulation, regulators, law, and policymakers. To assuage 
these paradoxic problems for emerging business enterprises, this Article 
proposes a minarchist heterodox solution of modest statutory language 
that requires market-based solutions that employ needed risk reduction 
strategies while redeploying necessary capital to private startup business 
enterprises. This proposal thus benefits the middle class entrepreneurs, 
suppliers of capital, and job seekers harmed by the current regulatory re-
gime, while permitting for an expansion of the U.S. and global economies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Money ... has often been a cause of the delusion of multitudes. Sober 
nations have all at once become desperate gamblers, and risked almost 
their existence upon the turn of a piece of paper.1 
—Charles Mackay 
Time magazine published an article in April 2013 indicating that many 
reasons explain why an online virtual currency “is a classic bubble” and 
that “[m]any compare it to tulip mania in 17th century Holland, where 
prices of rare tulip bulbs soared to absurd heights and then crashed,” de-
stroying the lives of those who purchased tulip bulbs.2 “But the Bitcoin 
phenomenon is more than a bubble[,]” the piece continued.3 “It says some-
thing important about the current and future state of the global economy.”4 
Famously detailing both Holland’s tulip bubble, as well as the bub-
ble’s underpinnings in human economic and socio-psychological behavior, 
eighteenth century author Charles Mackay penned the legendary book, 
Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds.5 The tome 
not only discussed hundreds of government-authorized economic bubbles 
that involved massive fraud, but also described the delusional behavior of 
human economic actors in the midst of economic bubbles.6 While finan-
cial instruments, markets, business structures, and regulatory regimes have 
changed materially since Mackay’s work in the 1840s, sadly, the irrational 
                                                                                                                         
1 1 CHARLES MACKAY, MEMOIRS OF EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE 
MADNESS OF CROWDS VIII (London, Robson, Levey, & Franklyn 2d ed. 1852). 
2 Michael Sivy, The Real Significance of the Bitcoin Boom (and Bust), TIME (Apr. 12, 2013), 
http://business.time.com/2013/04/12/the-real-significance-of-the-bitcoin-boom-and-bust/. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 MACKAY, supra note 1. A speculative bubble is “a spike in asset values” and is 
generally “caused by exaggerated expectation of future growth, price appreciation, or other 
events ....” This in turn causes increased trading as investors have a heightened expectation 
of value, “pushing prices above what an objective analysis of the intrinsic value would 
suggest.” Speculative Bubble, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/spec 
ulativebubble.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). Some of the more famous bubbles include 
Tulipmania (1634–38), the Mississippi Bubble (1719–20), the South Sea Bubble (1720), 
the Bull Market of the Roaring Twenties (1924–29), and the Japanese “Bubble Economy” 
(1984–89). Famous Bubbles: from Tulipmania to Japan’s “Bubble Economy”, FRONTLINE, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dotcon/historical/bubbles.html (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2014). 
6 See generally MACKAY, supra note 1. 
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behavior of economic actors transacting on imperfect information has 
seemingly remained static. 
Of Western economies’ myriad government-involved economic bub-
bles, perhaps no other work besides Extraordinary Popular Delusions and 
the Madness of Crowds could serve as both the foundation and overlay to 
advance the analysis for this Article’s thesis. That analysis lies at the nex-
us of two competing tensions relative to U.S. government regulation con-
cerning economic bubbles. Specifically, this Article addresses the U.S. 
federal government’s apparent contradictory—and perhaps even delusion-
al—behavior when comparing the over-regulation (only partly assuaged in 
the 2012 JOBS Act)7 in nascent capital formation platforms—popularly 
known as crowdfunding—with a near-stunning regulatory absence over 
decentralized convertible virtual crypto-currencies, the most common of 
which is presently Bitcoin.8 
The government should maintain consistency when regulating, right-
regulating, deregulating—or not regulating—alleged statutory goals relat-
ing to investment and capital deployment. In 2013 many painful demon-
strations of these inconsistencies occurred as illustrated by popular cul-
ture’s increased focus on crowdfunding’s largest current platform, 
Kickstarter, and e-currencies’ largest player, Bitcoin.9 As the U.S. and 
                                                                                                                         
7 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 
Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
8 See infra, Part  I. 
9 INOCENTE (Fine Films 2012). The film won an Oscar in 2013 for Best Documentary 
Short Subject. ‘Inocente' Wins Oscar: Best 'Documentary Short Subject' Tells Story Of 
Young Undocumented Latina Artist, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 24, 2013, 11:10 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/24/inocente-wins-oscar_n_2756514.html. 
Crowdfunding for the project on Kickstarter raised $52,257, exceeding its goal of $50,000. 
Inocente: Homeless. Creative. Unstoppable, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com 
/projects/1131717127/inocente-homeless-creative-unstoppable (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
Two other Kickstarter funded films were also nominated for awards: KINGS POINT (Sara 
Gilman 2012) and BUZKASHI BOYS (Afghan Film Project 2012). 2012 Nominations by 
Film, AND THE OSCAR GOES TO …, http://atogt.com/askoscar/dnoms.ph p?yr=85 (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2014). See also Linda Holmes, Pop Culture Happy Hour: Kickstarter TV 
and Comedy Contests, NPR (Mar. 22, 2013, 11:02 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/monke 
ysee/2013/03/22/175035168/pop-culture-happy-hour-kickstarter-tv-and-comedy-contests; 
Alyson Shontell, The 20 Most Successful Projects in Kickstarter History, THE ATLANTIC 
(July 12, 2011, 7:39 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology /archive/2011/07/the-20 
-most-successful-projects-in-kickstarter-history/241789/#slide15 (“The most popular projects 
were documentaries and iPhone accessories.”); Spike Lee Seeks $1.25 Million on 
Kickstarter for Film about “Addiction to Blood”, POP CULTURE BRAIN, http://popcul 
turebrain.com/post/56153908180/spike-lee-seeks-1-25-million-on-kickstarter-for-film (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2014); Jon Matonis, Top 10 Bitcoin Merchant Sites, FORBES (May 24, 
2013, 12:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2013/05/24/top-10-bitcoin-merc 
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global economies attempted to ascend from the Great Recession, despite 
the popular media and cultural coverage, U.S. federal agencies appeared 
oblivious about how to act in the face of the swiftly moving practical reali-
ties impacting global economic redevelopment.10 
First, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) seemingly 
moved at a snail’s pace to provide particular delayed-yet-statutorily-
required (and material) regulatory changes mandated under the JOBS Act, 
                                                                                                                         
hant-sites/; Kashmir Hill, Living On Bitcoin For A Week: The Expense Report, FORBES 
(May 17, 2013, 3:39 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashm irhill/2013/05/17/living-
on-bitcoin-for-a-week-the-expense-report/. 
10 This Article blends various analytics of development economics to support its 
thesis. Amplifying traditional economists (Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Piero Sraffa, 
Gunnar Myrdal, John Maynard Keynes, Friedrich Hayek, and Milton Friedman) to 
analyze how current laws, regulations, and policies may function in the context of a 
fragile global economy’s (re)development, I included, among others, Duncan Kennedy, 
David Kennedy, Joseph Stiglitz, and Deepak Lal. Lal’s influential work has been called a 
socio-economic blend of market failure policy analysis that Joseph Stiglitz later 
employed in Stiglitz’s market failure policy analysis criticizing market signals in favor of 
political socio-cultural signals in economic development. See Deepak Lal, The Dirigiste 
Dogma, in THE POVERTY OF ‘DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS’ 39 (1985); Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
Participation and Development: Perspectives from The Comprehensive Development 
Paradigm, 6 REV. OF DEV. ECON. 163 (2002); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Senior Vice President & 
Chief Economist, Keynote Address at the World Bank Annual Bank Conf. on Dev. 
Econ.: Whither Reform? Ten Years of the Transition 63–64 (Apr. 28–30, 1999), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTABCDEWASHINGTON1999/Resources/stiglitz.p
df. Heterodox international development law scholar David Kennedy asserted that “[a] 
great deal of law was required to translate the leading economic theories of development 
into policy[,] ... [which] demanded the creation of numerous public law institutions, 
established by statute and implemented by public law bureaucracies: exchange controls, 
credit licensing schemes, ... tax incentives ... national commodity monopolies,” that 
legislation needed to occur to achieve these ends, and “[a] vastly expanded administrative 
apparatus, with rule making, licensing, and other legal authority would need to be set up,” 
whether among Keynesian liberals, dirigiste leftists, centrists, or the neoliberal “Chicago 
School” devotees, and argued that all sides advocated legal intervention in an economic 
system to implement their respective political goals. David Kennedy, “The Rule of Law,” 
Political Choices, and Development Common Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT, A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 95, 102 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 
2006). See also id. at 151, 153 (synthesizing Lal and Stiglitz). Duncan Kennedy’s critical 
legal studies view led to his assertion that social law coordinated classical legal thought 
stakeholders via “public agencies that were to make rules to instantiate relatively abstract 
and vague legislative pronouncements (for example, in the U.S. context, a federal statute 
banning ... ‘deceptive practices’ in securities law)” and left civil libertarians to “attack[] 
the institutions as denying individual rights and the administrators as arbitrary and 
implicitly authoritarian manipulators of vacuous general standards and empty expertise.” 
Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE 
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 84–85 (David M. 
Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). 
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relative to how businesses may solicit investor capital.11 In the Obama 
Administration’s second term, beginning in 2009, President Obama ap-
pointed and received Senate confirmation for the first SEC director in U.S. 
history with experience as a former federal prosecutor.12 Perhaps as an un-
surprising result, rather than imbue a focus on implementing the rules and 
regulations required of the SEC within the timeline stated in the JOBS 
Act, which became law in 2012, during 2013, the SEC instead appeared to 
focus its admittedly limited resources on high-profile prosecutions of al-
leged perpetrators of insider trading, a victimless crime in an efficient 
market.13 The JOBS Act’s hailed panacea appears to represent a net detri-
ment to, rather than protection of, middle-class U.S. investors, entrepre-
neurs, and job-seekers, thereby harming national economic redevelopment 
under a statute unmistakably called the JOBS Act. 
Second, in March 2013, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN), applied the authority granted to it under the Bank Secrecy Act 
(BSA)14 and issued new interpretive guidelines15 under longstanding provisions 
                                                                                                                         
11 See Ben Goad, SEC Accused of Dawdling on JOBS Act Enabling Rules, THE HILL 
(Apr. 4, 2013, 4:01 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/regwatch/finance/293415-gop-lawmake 
r-sec-moving-too-slow-on-jobs-act-rules; Michelle Quinn, Slow-moving SEC Blamed for 
Blocking JOBS Act, POLITICO (Apr. 9, 2013, 4:43 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/20 
13/04/slow-moving-sec-blamed-for-blocking-jobs-act-89769.html; Robb Mandelbaum, 
‘Crowdfunding’ Rules Are Unlikely to Meet Deadline, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2012, at B1. 
12 See Susan Crabtree & Tim Devaney, Obama Picks Ex-prosecutor to Head SEC, 
WASH. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jan/24/obama 
-picks-top-prosecutor-head-sec/?page=all; Dina ElBoghdady, Mary Jo White Confirmed 
as SEC Chief, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-0 
8/business/38373590_1_mary-jo-white-al-franken-credit-rating-agency-industry. 
13 Emily Flitter et al., U.S. Charges SAC Capital with Insider Trading Crimes, REUTERS 
(July 25, 2013, 7:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/25/us-sac-fund-
charges-i dUSBRE96O0SD20130725; Peter Lattman & William Alden, 2 Ex-Hedge Fund 
Traders Are Found Guilty in Insider Trading Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2012, at B1; 
LibertyPen, John Stossel - The Case For Insider Trading, YOUTUBE (Apr. 24, 2012), 
http://www .youtube.com/watch?v=P68zqj13XaU (quoting Milton Friedman who said in 
2003: “You should want more insider trading, not less. You want to give the people the 
most likely to have the knowledge about deficiencies of the company an incentive to make 
the public aware of that.”); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248–49, 253–55 
(1988) (embracing the efficient market theory for equities, but concurrence warning of using 
this theory); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING (Found. Press 
1999).  
14 See Treas. Order 180-01 (Mar. 24, 2003), available at http://www.treasury.gov 
/about/role-of-treasury/orders-directives/Pages/to180-01.aspx. 
15 U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FIN-2013-G001, 
GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, 
EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.fincen.gov 
/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf (attempting to clarify “the applicability of 
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of the BSA16 and—only two months later, in May 2013—indicted and 
seized the assets of a decentralized convertible virtual currency exchange 
(yet again, in a high-profile manner for the mainstream media).17 The world 
of crypto-currencies serves as a sharp departure from a single federal gov-
ernment that logically ought to be striving to accomplish one related policy 
objective. The extant regulatory world represents a puzzlingly complex, di-
vided, and therefore futile, administrative regime, inconsequential in its at-
tempts to affect meaningful disincentives from any crowd madness that may 
fuel speculative economic bubbles in a still fragile economy.18 Perhaps 
some, or all, of these events led to a bipartisan Senate demand of the Obama 
administration on August 13, 2013, for “a holistic and whole-government 
approach to understand and provide a sensible regulatory framework,” 
which included, among other agencies, the Federal Reserve, the SEC, and 
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).19 
Part I of this Article articulates the history and context of behavioral 
economics and finance that has underpinned human economic behavior 
from tulipmania through today. Part II analyzes new virtual currencies and 
payment systems unimagined by nearly any law or regulation currently 
existing. Part III describes the concept of crowdfunding and identifies many 
legal provisions that have hindered equity-based crowdfunding of legitimate 
                                                                                                                         
the regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy Act (‘BSA’) to persons creating, obtaining, 
distributing, exchanging, accepting, or transmitting virtual currencies. Such persons are 
referred to ... as ‘users,’ ‘administrators,’ and ‘exchangers,’” but “[a] user of a virtual 
currency is not an MSB [Money Service Business] under FinCEN’s regulations and 
therefore is not subject to MSB registration, reporting, and recordkeeping regulations.” 
Having said that, “an administrator or exchanger is an MSB under FinCEN’s regulations,” 
and “[a]n administrator or exchanger is not a ... dealer in foreign exchange, under FinCEN’s 
regulations.”). This matter is detailed, supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
16 31 U.S.C.A. § 5330(a)(1) (West 2014) (“Any person who owns or controls a money 
transmitting business shall register the business (whether or not the business is licensed as a 
money transmitting business in any State” with FinCEN)); see also Amendment to the 
Bank Secrecy Act Regulations-Definitions Relating to, and Registration of, Money Services 
Businesses, 64 Fed. Reg. § 45438 n.1 (Aug. 20, 1999) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. §103); 
31 C.F.R. § 1022.380 (2011). 
17 See, e.g., US Prosecutes ‘$6bn Money-Laundering Hub’, BBC NEWS TECH. (May 
28, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22686777?print=true; see also 
Redacted AUSA Application with Exhibits, Redacted Domain SW, Redacted Injunction 
Order, Redacted PIRO, Related Exchanger Website Domain Names Redacted Filed 
Complaint, Indictment-Redacted, United States v. Liberty Reserve, No. 13 Crim. 368 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/May13/Libe 
rtyReserveetalDocuments.php. 
18 See discussion of Bitcoins and other electronic currencies, supra note 9. 
19 Timothy B. Lee, Congress Starts Investigating Bitcoin, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2013, 
12:26 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/13/congress 
-starts-investigating-bitcoin/. 
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businesses, thereby harming middle-class entrepreneurs, investors, job 
seekers, workers, and constraining economic production possibilities fron-
tiers. Part IV synthesizes the ostensible cognitive dissonance between the 
government’s crowdfunding restrictions and its refusal to regulate virtual 
currencies, such as Bitcoins. This Part presents a heterodox-inspired solu-
tion that borrows from what I believe to be the best of both regulated and 
unregulated policy in the U.S. to achieve maximum freedom with corre-
sponding protection for the U.S. middle-class and broader economy. The 
Article concludes that specific re-regulatory schemes may provide workable 
solutions not only to stem the excessive volatility of Bitcoin bubbles but 
also to kickstart the heart of crowdfunding, thus advancing economic de-
velopment via entrepreneurship, job creation, new internal governance 
ideas, and investment opportunities with traditional equity-like returns. 
I. OVERVIEW OF BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND ECONOMICS 
A. Descriptive and Comparative Analysis of Behavioral Finance 
Behavioral Finance and Economics (BFE) broadly refers to interdisci-
plinary academic discussion and model development of human psychology 
and financial markets.20 BFE was developed after certain academic re-
searchers, perhaps when climbing down the ladders from their ivory towers, 
noticed that economic actors do not necessarily act as neoclassical econom-
ics predicts. For instance, they act neither with perfect information nor in a 
perfectly rational manner.21 These anomalies did not exist in earlier modern 
economic and financial theories, including the efficient market theory,22 the 
utility theory,23 or homo economicus.24 
                                                                                                                         
20 Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance, 17 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 83, 90–91 (2003). 
21 Id. at 96–97. 
22 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and Behavioral 
Finance, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 283, 284 (1998) (stating that the efficient market theory’s 
premise that prices fully reflect available information and noting errors including not 
considering information-processing biases that may cause an investor to overreact or 
underreact to an asset’s market price in comparison to other investors’ reactions to the 
same asset’s market price). 
23 See, e.g., Behavioral Finance vs. Traditional Finance Theory, MARKET REALIST, 
http://marketrealist.com/behavioral-finance-micro-bfmi-behavioral-finance-macro-bfma/ 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (describing the utility theory’s assumption that investors make 
economic decisions in a consistent and independent manner relative to other potentially 
useful choices, resulting in the investor exercising the same decisions, even when 
combining or weighing unfavorable outcomes with other, more favorable decisions). 
24 See Maurice E. Stucke, Virtual Symposium Foreword: The Rise of Behavioral Law 
and Economics, 13 TENN. J. BUS. L. 309, 309 (2012) (indicating that homo economicus 
assumes that a purported average investor acts rationally and only as a self-interested 
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In contrast, BFE advocates assert that theory must include not only 
economics and finance but also the psychological theories accounting for 
social norms, emotions, and myriad extraneous factors influencing indi-
vidual economic decision-making.25 Scholars including Daniel Kahneman, 
Terrance Odean, and Brad Barber, indicate that BFE theory “closely com-
bines individual behavior and market phenomena and uses knowledge tak-
en from both the psychological field and financial theory.”26 As opposed 
to employing the neoclassical economic assumption that economic actors’ 
choices always result from rational decision-making, BFE scholars lever-
age novel data that help explain investor judgment to encourage behavior-
al modifications among investors to achieve a more rational and profit 
maximizing outcome.27 Neoclassical theory asserts that irrational deci-
sions represent judgments inexplicable under a “normative rationality” of 
profit maximization.28 
BFE contends, however, that investors cannot make decisions or process 
information without interjecting individual human biases or emotions.29 
Macro-level BFE research involves investors’ psychological biases that 
may cloud an economic decision,30 while micro-level BFE metadata posit 
                                                                                                                         
profit-maximizer, with great willpower). Overall, scholars of modern finance including 
the late Herbert Simon, a political scientist and professor of psychology at Carnegie-
Mellon University, argue that people are “boundedly rational … [by] us[ing] their 
resources in sensible ways to adjust to the prevailing situational demands.” Tommy 
Gärling, et. al, Psychology, Financial Decision Making, and Financial Crises, 10 
PSYCHOL. SCI. IN PUB. INT. 1, 6 (2010). 
25 Why Behavioral Finance is Relevant to the Investor, MARKET REALIST, http://market 
realist.com/risks/behavioral-risks/why-behavioral-finance-is-relevant-to-the-individual-in 
vestor/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
26 Hubert Fromlet, The Behavioral Finance-Theory and Practical Application: 
Systematic Analysis of Departure from the Homo Economicus Program Are Essential for 
Realistic Financial Research and Analysis, 36 BUS. ECON. 63, 65 (2001). 
27 See Why Behavioral Finance is Relevant to the Investor, supra note 25. 
28 Roy Sembel & Irwan Trinugroho, Overconfidence and Excessive Trading 
Behavior: An Experimental Study, 6 INT’L J. BUS. & MGMT. 147, 147 (2011). Having said 
that, as controversial economist Amartya Sen indicated: 
[It is simply not adequate to take as our basic objective just the maxi-
mization of income or wealth, which is, as Aristotle noted, ‘merely use-
ful and for the sake of something else.’ For the same reason, economic 
growth cannot sensibly be treated as an end in itself .... [It must] be 
more concerned with enhancing the lives we lead and the freedoms we 
enjoy. Expanding the freedoms that we have reason to value not only 
makes our lives richer and more unfettered, but also allows us to be 
fuller social persons, exercising our own volitions and interacting 
with—and influencing—the world in which we live. 
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 14–15 (1999). 
29 See Why Behavioral Finance is Relevant to the Investor, supra note 25. 
30 See Sembel, supra note 28. 
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several reasons to explain why investors make irrational economic deci-
sions.31 Erik Gerding argued that these types of irrational investors are 
“unsophisticated investors [who] trade on ‘noise’—information not related 
to assessing the fundamental value of assets.”32 Gerding referred to irra-
tional investors as “noise traders” who “evaluate whether to buy or sell 
assets based on price trends, emotions, or estimations about what other 
investors in the market will do.”33 
The existing research base relative to investors who make irrational 
decisions under neoclassical economic theory suggests the cause is a pan-
oply of psychological biases: anchoring,34 overconfidence,35 hindsight,36 
                                                                                                                         
31 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477–78 (1998); see also Steve Christ, 
Behavioral Finance Theory: 11 Reasons Why What You Think Could Be Wrong, WEALTH 
DAILY (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.wealthdaily.com/articles/behavioral-finance-theory/1929. 
32 Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An Experimental-Asset-Market Approach 
to Analyzing Financial Regulation, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 977, 995 (2007). 
33 Id. Having worked on an institutional investor trading floor for over a decade, I 
occasionally witnessed hugely successful professional investors make economic 
decisions based on emotional factors, price trends, and ideas of what competitors could 
be doing. Yet I would never refer to my former colleagues as anything remotely 
approaching “irrational” investors, “noise traders,” or unsophisticated economic actors 
because of making such decisions from time to time, and their track record evidences 
superior asset management. See Mutual Fund Quote: JPMorgan High Yield Select, 
MORNING STAR, http:// quotes.morningstar.com/fund/OHYFX/f?t=OHYFX (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2014). 
34 See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson, SuperBias: The Collision of Behavioral Economics and 
Implicit Social Cognition, 45 AKRON L. REV. 591, 602 (2012) (indicating that anchoring 
occurs when uninformative numbers influence economic actors, and “[a]nchoring effects 
are caused by the increased accessibility of information related to an anchor. When people 
see an anchor, they first quickly evaluate whether it might be the correct response. As part 
of this process, people rely on their memories to recall instances that might confirm the 
truth (or prove the untruth) of the anchor. Thus, investors anchor on the latest information 
or events as to what a particular [asset] may be worth.” The rationale is that investors are 
uninformed, not because of insufficient information, but rather because of too much 
information, which irrationally affects their economic decision making). See also David 
John Marotta, Behavioral Finance: Anchoring, MAROTTA WEALTH MGMT. (July 21, 2008), 
http://www.emarotta.com/behavioral-finance-anchoring-2/. 
35 In BFE, “overconfidence” refers to “the tendency of decision makers to unwittingly 
give excessive weight to the assessment of knowledge and accuracy of information 
possessed and ignore the public information available.” Roy Sembel & Irwan 
Trinugroho, Overconfidence and Excessive Trading Behavior: An Experimental Study, 6 
INT’L J. BUS. & MGMT. 147, 148 (July 2011). Thus, an investor’s overconfidence may 
lead that investor to mistakenly believe the investor can control a particular situation 
when doing so is impossible. See Fromlet, supra note 26, at 63, 66. 
Simply put, “people think they know more than they do,” which leads to an irrational 
decision, ignorant of risk analysis. Fromlet, supra note 26, at 66 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Overconfidence also may explain an investor’s large number of trades, and those 
large numbers’ correlation with poor investment performance. See Brad M. Barber & 
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representativeness,37 and perhaps most apparent to popular observers of 
the economy and investment markets, herding effects.38 These BFE biases 
                                                                                                                         
Terrance Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock Investment 
Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. OF FIN. 773, 773–74, (2000). Barber and Odean 
reasoned that “[o]verconfident investors will overestimate the value of their private 
information, causing them to trade too actively and, consequently, to earn below-average 
returns.” Id. at 800. Yet when investors receive below-average returns, the investors often 
blame the result on bad luck or other people. The Perils for Investors of Human Nature 
People Tend to Take the Credit for Success and Blame Failure on Bad Luck. The Resulting 
Overconfidence Can Be Dangerous, Warn Simon Gervais and Terrance Odean, FIN. TIMES, 
June 18, 2001, at 2. 
Sex-based overconfidence bias exists, as well. Specifically, “men claim more ability 
[to invest] than do women.” Terry Odean, Address at Legg Mason Funds Management 
Investment Conference: What I Know About How You Invest (Nov. 2003). Yet studies 
evidence that “males not only sell their investments at the wrong time but also experience 
higher trading costs than their female counterparts.” Victor Ricciardi & Helen K. Simon, 
What Is Behavioral Finance?, 2 BUS., EDUC., & TECH. J., Fall 2000, at 4. Additional 
research indicated that “over a six-year period, men on average traded 45% more than 
women,” and men were reducing their net returns by 1 percentage point more per year 
than women. Michael M. Pompian & John M. Longo, A New Paradigm for Practical 
Application of Behavioral Finance: Creating Investment Programs Based on Personality 
Type and Gender to Produce Better Investment Outcomes, 7 J. WEALTH MGMT., Fall 
2004, at 10; see also Victor Reklaitis, Investing Problems: Men, Overconfidence and 
Trading, INVESTOR’S CORNER (2012), http://education.investors.com/investors-corner 
/602404-men-often-overconfident-in-investing.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). An 
annual difference of one percent compounded over an investing lifetime represents a 
meaningful return differential. 
36 Hindsight bias suggests that when investors know how a particular situation may 
turn out, investors subsequently cannot disregard that information in future decision-
making contexts, regardless of the probability or magnitude of the occurrence. To 
illustrate, researchers asked Washington, D.C. residents, two months after suffering a 
small earthquake in 2010, their thoughts concerning the likelihood of another earthquake 
in Washington, D.C. the following year. Even though the probability of another 
earthquake affecting those residents one year later was quite small, the earthquake’s 
personal impact resulted in residents over-estimating the likelihood. Levinson, supra note 
34, at 595–600. 
37 Representativeness bias refers to “the tendency of individuals to classify things into 
discrete groups based on similar characteristics,” thereby focusing on similarities, rather 
than independent characteristic variables. Wesley S. Chan, Richard M. Frankel, & S.P. 
Kothari, Testing Behavioral Finance Theories Using Trends and Sequences in Financial 
Performance (Mass. Inst. of Tech. (“M.I.T.”) Sloan School of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 
4375-02, June 2003). For example, investors may fail to incorporate matching quantitative 
or qualitative information in their predictions, and fail to realize extreme observations are 
unlikely to be repeated. Id. Investors subsequently become disappointed with the below-
average returns they received because the investors “mentally misplace[d] firms into 
various groups based on the past performance,” regardless of the statistical significance of 
such past performance. Id. at 21. 
38 Perhaps the most frequently apparent BFE observation is “herd behavior.” Fromlet, 
supra note 26, at 63, 66. Herd behavior is best described as “following the crowd.” 
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often can represent superior explanations of market price changes com-
pared to the ambiguously phrased “prices fully reflect available infor-
mation.”39 These various biases, particularly those that cause growth-
based spiraling behaviors demonstrated in BFE research may help to con-
textualize both the causes and the effects of economic bubbles in which 
investors may find themselves. 
B. Linkage Between Psychological Biases and Financial Bubble 
Definitions 
While psychological biases explain the phenomena of financial bub-
bles, financial bubbles—sometimes referred to as speculative or market 
bubbles—occur when “a broad-based, surging euphoria or wave of opti-
mism carries asset prices well beyond supportable value.”40 Erik Gerding 
provided one explanation of how bubbles form by using two actors: noise 
traders,41 as referenced above, and so-called “smart money”: 
First, a “displacement”—either an external macroeconomic or political 
event or good news about a specific industry—causes corporate profits 
to rise. Investors with superior information make conspicuous gains as 
share prices rise. Noise traders, attracted by rising prices, enter the 
market and bid prices even higher, adopting positive-feedback invest-
ment strategies. Informed investors and arbitrageurs (known as “smart 
money”) anticipate noise-trader demand and bid-up prices in advance 
of noise traders, further stimulating demand. When smart money senses 
                                                                                                                         
Andreas Park & Hamid Sabourian, Herding and Contrarian Behavior in Financial 
Markets, 79 ECONOMETRICA 973, 974 (2011). In these situations, investors may have 
substantial information on a particular event or situation, yet the information is 
“swamped” when they observe others acting contrary to the information retained by the 
investor. Id. Herding bias goes against the assumption of a rational investor because the 
realistic investor will irrationally choose to ignore information that may better predict the 
result of possible innovations and waste investment capital theorizing that so many others 
are going to do it. See Gerding, supra note 32, at 996–97. Herding thus creates a vicious 
cycle, “[i]f prices of an asset rise, investors who pursue these strategies bid prices higher 
as they base their analysis on the asset-price trend. The resulting rise in prices further 
increases demand among … [other irrational investors], and a [positive] feedback loop 
develops.” Gerding, supra note 32, at 997. In the end, the market crashes and everyone is 
disappointed in their below average return, justifying their failures by the fact that 
everyone else was negatively affected by the drop in price. Cf. MACKAY, supra note 1 
and accompanying text (explaining the Tulip bulb bubble). 
39 Eugene F. Fama, Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and Behavioral Finance, 
49 J. FIN. ECON. 283, 284 (1998). 
40 Adam Nash, Behavioral Finance Explains Bubbles, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 20, 2013), http 
://techcrunch.com/2013/04/20/what-can-behavioral-finance-can-teach-us-about-bubbles/. 
41 See supra notes 32–33. 
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the market overheating, it sells. Ultimately, noise traders follow and, 
once a tipping point is reached, prices crash.42 
Regardless of precisely how bubbles form, evidence strongly suggests 
that “[b]ubbles…have an emotional component ....”43 A bubble’s emotional 
components can be explained by applying some of the psychological biases 
described above: 
 First, applying anchoring bias, an investor becomes aware of 
a random number about a new financial innovation and grav-
itates in that direction when investing in the new fad.44  
 Second, an investor displays overconfidence when investing 
in a developing economic bubble by overestimating self-
intelligence and relative investing capabilities.45  
 Third, an investor applies hindsight bias and over-emphasizes 
a past investing experience to the present or future predictabil-
ity, even if the investor’s predictions are nearly impossible.46  
 Fourth, basing investment decisions on representativeness 
bias, the investor would be unlikely to consider sufficiently 
the relevant risks because the investor would fail to predict 
accurately the odds of success in a new investment prior to 
deploying sufficiently large amounts of capital.47  
 Fifth, and perhaps most noticeable, the investor likely would 
mimic the actions of what “everyone else” was doing and 
would engage in the herd behavior that often results in “self-
reinforcing cycles of aggregate behavior,” even when quanti-
tative and qualitative data demonstrates that the new fad 
about to separate economic actors from their invested capital 
is likely to fail.48 
Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds contains 
several chapters describing historical events evidencing the confluence of 
herd behavior and financial bubbles.49 One example discussed the famous 
“Mississippi Scheme,” in which French investors created an economic 
                                                                                                                         
42 Gerding, supra note 32, at 999. 
43 Nash, supra note 40. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. 
48 Id. 
49 MACKAY, supra note 1. 
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bubble via buying ownership interests in a trade company engaged in re-
source development from the Mississippi area.50 The French investors 
turned huge profits until the entire market for ownership interests in the 
venture collapsed. When the book turned to the most famous financial 
bubble, Holland’s “Tulip Mania,” Mackay wrote, “in 1634, the rage 
among the Dutch to possess [tulips] was so great that the ordinary industry 
of the country was neglected, and the population, even to its lowest dregs, 
embarked on the tulip trade.”51 Later in the same week that I submitted the 
formal summer research grant proposal to fund this Article’s research, 
Benjamin Radford briefly compared tulip bulbs to Bitcoins and wrote that 
investors who saw the price of tulips exponentially increase.52 He believed 
they could achieve the same results by purchasing more and more tulips, 
thus creating a craze that attracted an increasing number of investors to 
tulips at increasing prices.53 By 1637, however, the smart money sold their 
tulips, and within weeks the tulip bubble burst.54 In describing tulip mania, 
Radford stated that after the bubble burst, “[m]any [investors] were finan-
cially ruined, and the whole fiasco became an infamous textbook case of 
investment speculation gone awry,” leaving readers with the ominous con-
clusion that “the tulip mania craze holds important lessons for economists 
and sociologists—and maybe Bitcoin investors as well” as “[u]nlike [a] 
Bitcoin[‘s virtual existence] ... [tulips] had the potential to actually exist.”55 
II. CURRENCIES, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, AND BITCOINS 
To understand what constitute “virtual currencies,”56 and what laws, 
rules, regulations, and agency may apply and oversee such currencies, I be-
lieve that the reader would benefit from an explanation of the complex inter-
play among (i) currencies,57 which throughout history were often made with 
                                                                                                                         
50 Id. at B. 
51 Id. 
52 Benjamin Radford, Bitcoin Currency Inspires Tulip Mania Comparisons, DISCOVERY 
NEWS (Apr. 16, 2013, 1:12 PM), http://news.discovery.com/history/bitcoins-and-dutch-tul 
ipmania-lessons-in-investor-madness-130416.html. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 FinCEN Guidance FIN-2013-G001, supra note 15 (comparing FinCEN’s 
description of a “real” currency possessing legal tender status as per 31 C.F.R. § 
1010.100(m) with a “virtual” currency serving as an exchange medium lacking legal 
tender status in any jurisdiction). 
57 A currency has traditionally represented what a specific nationality employed as its 
monopolistic legal tender. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, DENATIONALISATION OF 
MONEY 48, 90, 106 (Inst. of Econ. Affairs 3d ed. 1990); see also Andrew K. Rose, One 
Money, One Market: Estimating the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade, Seminar 
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gold; (ii) commodities,58 of which gold is one example; and (iii) money, 
which was backed by gold in the U.S. until the Bretton Woods collapse and 
removal of the U.S. dollar from the gold standard in the early 1970s.59 
A recent high profile and temperamental exchange between House 
Subcommittee on Monetary Policy Chairman Ron Paul and Federal Re-
serve Chairman Ben Bernanke—both Republicans—contextualizes the 
                                                                                                                         
Paper No. 678, 2–3 (Inst. for Int’l Econ. Studies 1999), available at http://su.diva-portal 
.org/smash/get/diva2:328473/FULLTEXT01. In addition to the “real” and “virtual” 
currencies described supra note 56, one may divide real currencies further by distinguishing 
between “public” currencies, subject to government monopolies, and “private” currencies, 
with private currencies being considered “concurrent” currencies. HAYEK at 26. 
58 See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1a (West 2014) (defining 
commodities as: “wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, 
mill feeds, butter, eggs, Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats and 
oils (including lard, tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, and all other fats and 
oils), cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean meal, livestock, livestock 
products, and frozen concentrated orange juice ... and all services, rights, and interests ... 
in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”). 
The film, Trading Places, arguably defined commodities simpler than the statute 
(“[W]hat are commodities? Commodities are agricultural products … like coffee, that you 
had for breakfast … wheat, which is used to make bread … pork bellies, which is used to 
make bacon, which you might find in a ‘bacon, lettuce and tomato’ sandwich. And then 
there are other commodities like, frozen orange juice ... and GOLD. Though, of course, 
gold doesn’t grow on trees like oranges.”). TRADING PLACES (Paramount Pictures 1983). 
In addition, the film served as the basis for the CFTC to change risk-based regulation of 
commodities. See Hearing to Review Implementation of Changes to the Commodity 
Exchange Act Contained in the 2008 Farm Bill before the Subcommittee on General 
Farm Commodities and Risk Management of the Committee of Agriculture, 111th Cong. 
2d. Sess. (statement of Hon. Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg55459/html 
/CHRG-111hhrg55459.htm. Gensler stated that: 
[w]e have recommended banning using misappropriated government 
information to trade in the commodity markets. In the movie “Trading 
Places,” starring Eddie Murphy, the Duke brothers intended to profit 
from trades in frozen concentrated orange juice futures contracts using 
an illicitly obtained and not yet public Department of Agriculture or-
ange crop report. Characters played by Eddie Murphy and Dan 
Aykroyd intercept the misappropriated report and trade on it to profit 
and ruin the Duke brothers. In real life, using such misappropriated 
government information actually is not illegal under our statute. To 
protect our markets, we have recommended what we call the “Eddie 
Murphy” rule to ban insider trading using nonpublic information mis-
appropriated from a government source.  
Id. 
59 See, e.g., BARRY EICHENGREEN, THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM: PARADISE LOST?, 
IN THE GOLD STANDARD IN THEORY AND HISTORY 313, 315–21 (Routledge, 2d ed. 1997). 
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confusion among these terms, even among the highest ranking fiscal and 
monetary policymakers in the U.S.: 
Paul: Do you think gold is money? 
Bernanke: [long pause] No. 
.... 
Paul: Even if it has been money for 6,000 years, somebody 
reversed that and eliminated that economic law? 
.... 
Paul: Why do central banks hold it, if it’s not money? 
Bernanke: Well, it’s a form of reserves. 
Paul: Why don’t they hold diamonds? 
Bernanke: Well it’s tradition—long-term tradition.60 
With this disorder as a backdrop, this Part attempts to analyze the 
threats—to economies, markets, governments, regulators, policymakers, 
investors, and speculators—associated with the advent of new and highly 
volatile forms of exchange mediums, of which Bitcoin currently represents 
the most visible.61 
A. Background and History 
1. Real, Virtual, and Fiat Currencies; Commodities; Money; and Inflation 
In the mid-1970s, Friedrich von Hayek, an economics Nobel laureate, 
stated “[t]here is no reason to doubt that private enterprise would, if 
permitted, have been capable of providing as good and at least as trust-
worthy coins,”62 as those imposed by government monopoly63 on mon-
ey.64 Hayek continued: 
                                                                                                                         
60 Monetary Policy and the State of the Economy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 46 (2011) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2 
NJnL10vZ1Y (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
61 Rhys Bollen, The Legal Status of Online Currencies: Are Bitcoins the Future?, 24 
J. BANKING & FIN. L. & PRACTICE 272, 272 (2013). 
62 HAYEK, supra note 57, at 30; see also Robin Teigland, Zeynep Yetis, & Tomas 
Larsson, Breaking Out of the Bank in Europe: Exploring Collective Emergent Institutional 
Entrepreneurship through Bitcoin 2–3 (SNEE Conference 2013, Working Paper, 2013), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2263707&download=yes 
(indicating that the Bitcoin community’s theoretical roots lay in the Hayekian Austrian School 
of economics, potentially threatening large financial institutions and global governments). 
63 Governmental regulatory enforcement mechanisms of monopolistic monetary 
policies have ranged apparently from China and France employing the death penalty to 
U.S. colonies treating repudiation of Continental notes as an enemy act. See, e.g., 
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If the public understood what price in ... inflation and instability it 
pays for the convenience of having to deal with only one kind of 
money in ordinary transactions, and not have to ... contemplate the 
advantage of using money than the familiar kind, it would probably 
find it very excessive .... [yet] we know that there are all kinds of oth-
er possible sorts of money, not least paper, which government is even 
less competent to handle and even more prone to abuse than paper 
money.65 
First, a currency has traditionally represented a government monopo-
ly’s legal tender.66 When the basis of currency pricing relies on some-
thing besides that government’s precious metal reserves, that currency 
becomes known as a “‘fiat currenc[y]’ [, which] ha[s] value simply be-
cause their backing governments identified the currency as ‘legal ten-
der.’”67 By printing or creating additional fiat currency units over time, 
the currency supply relative to its demand generally increases, thus “re-
                                                                                                                         
ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN LAW, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 53 (Found. Press 
1950); see also HAYEK, supra note 57, at 28 (stating “[g]overnments have at all times 
[preceding the 6th century B.C.E., he notes] had a strong interest in persuading the public 
that the right to issue money belongs exclusively to them.”); see also id. at 30–31 
(indicating, “[t]he significance of the gradual appearance of government paper money [as 
opposed to solid coinage minted from government-owned metal reserves], and soon of bank 
notes, is for our purposes complicated” by using paper claims on metal issued by 
government monopoly due to the use of paper claims. Hayek continued, “because for a long 
time the problem was not the appearance of new kinds of money with a different 
denomination [i.e., face amount], but the use as money of paper claims on the established 
kind of metallic money issued by government monopoly[,]” thereby shifting government’s 
role from minter of stored metal to coinage to a backer of paper money by reserves of that 
metal to determining how much paper money may be printed, regardless of any metallic 
backing [called fiat money]. This series of events prompted Hayek to assert that 
“governments have become wholly inadequate for the task and, it can be said without 
qualifications, have incessantly and everywhere abused their trust to defraud the people.” 
(emphasis added)). Cf. Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital 
Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159, 182, 187 (2012) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8; United States v. Gellman, 44 F. Supp. 360, 365–66 (D. Minn. 1942)) (asserting that 
“[t]he Constitution has nothing to say about private parties creating money.... For example 
in United States v. Gellman, the court warned that early money-related laws providing 
criminal penalties should be cautiously applied to new technologies.”). 
64 See Bollen, supra note 61, at 272 (claiming that “[m]oney, payment and currency are 
simply social constructs. What people are willing to treat as payment are payments, same as 
money.”). Cf. OKLA. ST. ANN. Tit. 12A, § 1-201(24) (West 2013) (defining “money” as a 
“medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government and 
includes a monetary unit of account established by an intergovernmental organization or by 
agreement between two or more countries”). 
65 HAYEK, supra note 57, at 28. 
66 See HAYEK supra note 57, at 56, 58 (Hayek’s definition of currency). 
67 Grinberg, supra note 63, at 173. 
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duc[ing] the value of the [previously existing] currency,” which “corre-
spondingly increases [the] prices” of that economy’s goods and services, 
resulting in the classic definition of inflation.68 As a result, people who 
fear inflation—which was a major cause of Hitler’s ascent to power in 
post–World War I Germany69—are prone to distrust fiat currencies and the 
governmental central banks70 that can cause inflation by printing addition-
al units of its monopolistic currency, eviscerating the purchasing power of 
its society. 
Second, given that the Director of the CFTC used the film Trading 
Places to explain commodities to congress, perhaps the best definition of 
commodities comes from the Trading Places scene.71  
Third, as economics Professor L. Randall Wray stated, “[d]efining 
money,” regardless of its form, “is a continually vexing problem for 
monetary theorists,” in which two general approaches exist: (1) “defining 
money by its functions (the textbook approach)” and (2) “choosing [arbi-
trarily] some empirical definition (as Keynes did) ....”72 Simply put, an 
arbitrary exchange, such as money, is traditionally associated with three 
functions: medium of exchange, unit of account, and store of value.73 
                                                                                                                         
68 Id. Inflation acts like a tax and is the result of a reduction in a currency’s 
purchasing power. See EUGENE F. BRIGHAM & JOEL F. HOUSTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 184, 191, 283 (Cengage Learning, 13th ed. 2013). 
69 See, e.g., HENRY ASHBY TURNER, JR., HITLER’S THIRTY DAYS TO POWER: JANUARY 
1933 2–3 (Basic Books 1996) (indicating that following the First World War, Germany 
suffered “a hyperinflation that destroyed the currency ....”); Melchior Palyi, Economic 
Foundations of the German Totalitarian State, 46 AM. J. SOC. 469, 469 (1991) 
(employing an “economic versus ideological interpretation of Nazism” to assert that 
“[t]he inflation of the early 1920’s delivered a moral [sic] blow at democracy as a form of 
government which shook the nation’s political loyalty by undermining its reliance upon 
security based on ‘saving’ .... [i]n their ‘despair’ a large sector of the German people 
were willing to follow Hitler ....”). 
70 See Alberto Alesina & Lawrence H. Summers, Central Bank Independence and 
Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, 25 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & 
BANKING 151, 154 (1993) (comparing the relative independence among central banks 
globally). 
71 See supra note 58. 
72 See Professor L. Randall Wray, Workshop Presentation at the Centre of Full 
Employment and Equity: Understanding Modern Money (Dec. 10 & 11, 2001) (citing 
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY 167 (Harcourt-Brace-Jovanovich 
1964)). Professor Wray also states that “a system based on a commodity money is not a 
‘money economy’ as Keynes defined it. Rather, the commodity money is an (imagined) 
economy in which money serves as nothing more than a numeraire ....” Id. at 5. See also 
L. RANDALL WRAY, UNDERSTANDING MONEY: THE KEY TO FULL EMPLOYMENT AND 
PRICE STABILITY (Edward Elgar Publ’g 2006). 
73 See Virtual Currency Schemes, EUR. CENT. BANK 1, 10 (Oct. 2012), http://www.ecb.e 
uropa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf [hereinafter ECB Report]. 
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Regardless of whether one views the U.S. dollar as currency, a com-
modity, or a unit of money, it remains a fiat medium of exchange since the 
separation from the gold standard in the early 1970s, leaving the U.S. dol-
lar open to unlimited issuance by a central bank and inflationary pressures. 
But “[u]nlike fiat currencies, whose value is derived through regulation or 
law and underwritten by the state,”74 virtual currencies are different for 
various reasons explored in the next section. 
2. Crypto Currencies, Virtual Currencies, and Other Appellations 
Several authors refer to cryptocurrencies,75 which represent an idea ex-
isting since at least the mid-1980s.76 One of the first cryptocurrencies, 
known as “DigiCash,” started in the early 1990s by an individual who 
“obtained ... digital currency patents in the 1980s related to ensuring ano-
nymity using cryptography.”77 Although DigiCash failed,78 the idea of an 
anonymous and cryptographic currency developed over the course of the 
1990s through the cypherpunk e-mail list that allegedly included individu-
als who “advocated the use of cryptography ... for the protection of private 
individuals, against each other and against the government.”79 
While one may scoff at the idea of a cryptocurrency or a cypherpunk e-
mail group, the group’s members included currently relevant newsmakers, 
such as Julian Assange, known for his whistleblowing activities as the found-
er of WikiLeaks.80 Some authors describe the cypherpunks as an e-mail list 
                                                                                                                         
74 Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, and the 
Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 115 (2012). 
75 See, e.g., William J. Luther & Josiah Olson, Bitcoin is Memory passim (Inst. For 
Human Studies at Geo. Mason Univ., Working Paper, 2013), available at http://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2275730; William J. Luther, Cryptocurrencies, 
Network Effects, and Switching Costs (Mercatus Ctr., Geo. Mason Univ., Working Paper, 
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2295134; Sarah Jeong, 
The Bitcoin Protocol as Law, and the Politics of a Stateless Currency (Working Paper, 2013), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2294124. 
76 Grinberg, supra note 63, at 169 n.46; Jeong, supra note 75, at 9. 
77 Grinberg, supra note 63, at 169 n.46. 
78 Id. 
79 Jeong, supra note 75, at 9. 
80 Id. Cf. Rainey Reitman, a Director at the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), an 
organization co-founded by former Cypherpunk John Gilmore, engaged in Bitcoin 
transactions but ceased doing so in 2011. She is also a co-founder of the Bradley Manning 
Support Network (supporting WikiLeaks whistleblower Pfc. Bradley Manning), and 
additionally supports Bitcoin as a method to provide needed anonymity to financially support 
patriotic causes such as whistleblowing on one’s government. About-Rainey Reitman, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/about/staff/rainey-reitman (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2014); Rainey Reitman, Bitcoin – a Step Toward Censorship-Resistant 
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with libertarian streaks, opposing most regulation, advocating for privacy, 
and seeking to use cryptography.81 Toward the end of the decade, in 1998, 
pseudonymously named Wei Dai, created the idea of b-money.82 B-money 
foreshadowed the allegedly pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto, author of 
the paper83 detailing the creation of the Bitcoin currency84 that appeared 
just as the U.S. and global economies and currencies began to plummet in 
2008–2009.85 Nakamoto’s germinal paper set the foundation for the pur-
pose of “cryptographic proof,” which was to purportedly serve as a “solu-
tion to…double spending” and described the creation of blocks, chains (or 
“blockchains”), and Bitcoins that go well beyond this Article’s scope.86 
Because cryptography is a key to Bitcoin’s success, many refer to virtual 
currencies as a cryptocurrency, while others, including government agen-
cies, refer to virtual currencies as an e-currency,87 digital currency,88 virtu-
al currency,89 or a decentralized convertible virtual currency.90 
At least a dozen virtual currencies exist as of this writing.91 Those in-
clude: (1) Litecoin (LTC) (called a “complementary cryptocurrency— ‘the 
silver to Bitcoin’s gold,’”), which as of May 11th, 2013, had approximately 
                                                                                                                         
Digital Currency, EFF DEEPLINKS BLOG (Jan. 20, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks 
/2011/01/bitcoin-st ep-toward-censorship-resistant. 
81 Grinberg, supra note 63, at 162. 
82 Wei Dai, b-money, WEI DAI’S HOME PAGE, http://weidai.com/bmoney.txt. 
83 See generally Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (2009), 
http://www.bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. On March 6, 2014, Newsweek allegedly revealed the face 
behind bitcoin. Leah McGrath Goodman, The Face Behind Bitcoin, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 6, 
2014), available at http://mag.newsweek.com/2014/03/14/bitcoin-satoshi-nakamoto.html. 
84 See Grinberg, supra note 63, at 162; Nakamoto, supra note 83. 
85 Jeong, supra note 75, at 12–13 (citation omitted) (indicating that while Satoshi 
never mentioned the cypherpunks or crypto anarchy on any Internet postings, “[i]nstead, 
Bitcoin was introduced to the world in the context of the 2008 financial crisis” as “an 
alternative to a system controlled by ‘financial institutions’”). 
86 Nakamoto, supra note 83. 
87 FinCEN Guidance FIN-2013-G001, supra note 15, at 3. 
88 Nicholas A. Plassaras, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin Within the 
Reach of the IMF, 14 CHI. J. INTL L. 377 (2013); Kaplanov, supra note 74. Both articles 
refer to Bitcoins as a “private digital currency.”  
89 Memorandum from Benjamin M. Lawsky on Notice of Inquiry on Virtual Currencies 
to N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Services (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/pr 
ess2013/memo1308121.pdf; Kelly Clay, Amazon Announces New Virtual Currency for 
Kindle Fire, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyclay/2013/02/05/a 
mazon-announces-new-virtual-currency-for-kindle-fire/. 
90 FinCEN Guidance FIN-2013-G001, supra note 15, at 3. 
91 Andrew R. Johnson, From Bitcoin to Amazon Coins: A Guide to Virtual 
Currencies, WALL ST. J. (May 31, 2013, 6:04 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013 
/05/31/from-bitcoin-to-amazon-coins-a-guide-to-virtual-currencies/. 
2014] KICKSTARTER MY HEART 511 
17 million LTC in circulation92 with a market price of $3.28 USD per LTC, 
for an aggregate market price of approximately $55.5 million USD, “mak-
ing it the most valuable cryptocurrency after Bitcoin;”93 (2) PPCoin 
(PPC), that purportedly has an additional security feature called “proof-of-
stake”94 but also represents a centralized virtual currency without an al-
leged cap on the number of PPC that could be created, thus more reflective 
of mainstream fiat currencies but less attractive to many founders and ear-
ly adopters of Bitcoins; other competing virtual currencies exist such as (3) 
Freicoin (FRC), (4) Namecoin, (5) Terracoin, (6) Ripple, and (7) Feather-
coin, among others.95 Numerous other virtual currencies have failed, includ-
ing Solidcoin, BBQCoin, Fairbrix, and GeistGold.96 Global e-commerce 
powerhouse Amazon entered the virtual currency arena in May 2013 with 
Amazon Coins, primarily to buy “apps, games, and in-app items.”97 This 
Article focuses on Bitcoins because Bitcoins currently represent the 
“world’s most widely used alternative currency,”98 and they have been 
that way since January 9, 2009 when Nakamoto announced via email the 
“first release of Bitcoin,”99 and the creation of the initial Bitcoin “block” 
(the “Genesis Block”)100 occurred. 
B. Specifically, What Are Bitcoins, and How Do They Function? 
Bitcoin is an electronic payment system “that uses peer-to-peer net-
working along with digital signatures and cryptographics to generate cur-
rency.”101 Bitcoins represent “a private digital currency traded online via a 
                                                                                                                         
92 Ian Steadman, Wary of Bitcoin? A Guide to Some Other Cyptocurrencies, 
ARSTECHNICA (May 11, 2013, 9:51 AM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2013/05/wary-of-b 
itcoin-a-guide-to-some-other-cryptocurrencies/. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Johnson, supra note 91. 
96 Steadman, supra note 92.  
97 Press Release, Amazon, Introducing Amazon Coins (Feb. 5, 2013), available at 
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=176060&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1781498&highl 
ight= (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
98 Justin Spittler, Bitcoin: Money of the Future or Fool’s Gold, WALL ST. CHEATSHEET 
(June 2, 2013), http://wallstcheatsheet.com/stocks/bitcoin-money-of-the-future-or-fools-gol 
d.html/?a=viewall. 
99 Email from Satoshi Nakamoto (Jan. 9, 2009, 5:05 PM), available at http://www.mailar 
chive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg10142.html [hereinafter Nakamoto email]. 
100 Joel Falconer, Bitcoin, the Peer-To-Peer Currency that Hopes to Change the World, 
TNW (June 5, 2011 8:30 AM), http://thenextweb.com/insider/2011/06/05/bitcoin-the-peer-t 
o-peer-currency-that-hopes-to-change-the-world/. 
101 Duncan Elms, A Brief Background on Bitcoin, DIGITAL FOR REAL LIFE (Apr. 23, 
2013), http://www.digitalforreallife.com/2013/04/bitcoin/. 
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peer-to-peer network.”102 Given the minarchist-libertarian milieu painted 
by many authors of virtual currency supporters, some authors believe that 
Bitcoins have several endearing features to this constituency. Four key 
distinctions exist between Bitcoins and fiat currencies. 
First, unlike fiat currencies, the Bitcoin system is alleged to have “a 
cap on the number of coins that will ever be generated”103 at 21 million 
Bitcoins,104 unlike the central bankers who can print money at will. As a 
result, “[m]any Bitcoin users are motivated by a belief that Bitcoin, unlike 
the dollar, is inflation-resistant ....”105 Second, hearkening to the days of 
precious metal-backed currencies, to distinguish them from fiat currencies, 
Bitcoins’ creation and distribution to the market occurs via computer 
“mining,” a model akin to “natural resource extraction, gold mining ....”106 
Specifically, computer users can mine Bitcoins via computer processing, 
which may force material overhead costs for users to produce Bitcoins.107 
Therefore, Bitcoins are “likely to be attractive to those who like gold-
backed currencies because its value depends on the availability of a lim-
ited (albeit virtual) resource rather than discretionary actions by central 
bankers.”108 Third, the Bitcoin Foundation has maintained that, instead of 
the currency’s backing by nothing, which is the case with fiat currencies, 
or by a precious metal such as gold, which was the case with traditional 
pre-Bretton Woods collapse currencies: “Bitcoin is backed exclusively by 
code .... Cryptography is the key to Bitcoin’s success.”109 Fourth, Bitcoins 
permit “two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the 
                                                                                                                         
102 Plassaras, supra note 88, at 2. 
103 Falconer, supra note 100. 
104 Id. Tom Standage, The Economist Explains: How Does Bitcoin Work, ECONOMIST 
(Apr. 11, 2013, 11:50 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04 
/economist-explains-how-does-bitcoin-work. 
105 Grinberg, supra note 63, at 198. 
106 James Niccolai, Bitcoin Developer Chats About Regulation, Open Source, and the 
Elusive Satoshi Nakamoto, PCWORLD (May 19, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://www.pcworld 
.com/article/2039184/bitcoin-developer-talks-regulation-open-source-and-the-elusive-sat 
oshi-nakamoto.html. 
107 See Emma Rowley, Russians Most Interested in Bitcoin, Searches Show, 
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 6, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/99 
76524/Russians-most-interested-in-Bitcoin-searches-show.html. 
108 Grinberg, supra note 63, at 168; see also Virtual Currencies: Mining Digital Gold, 
ECONOMIST (Apr. 11, 2013, 2:18 PM), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-econo 
mics/21576149-even-if-it-crashes-bitcoin-may-make-dent-financial-world-mining-digital 
(stating, “[w]hat makes Bitcoin different is that, unlike other online (and offline) currencies, it 
is neither created nor administered by a single authority such as a central bank.”). Cf. Turner, 
supra note 69 (describing the role of central bankers in fiat currencies and inflation). 
109 About Bitcoin, BITCOIN FOUNDATION, http://bitcoinfoundation.org/about/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 24, 2014) (emphasis added). 
2014] KICKSTARTER MY HEART 513 
need for a trusted third-party” or intermediary (or central issuer or payment 
system), where the basis of the transaction’s security is “cryptographic proof 
instead of trust.”110 
Despite the legitimate concern that these facts may cause for users of 
more traditional payment systems, currencies, commodities, money, and 
marketplaces, Bitcoins currently are exchangeable for at least thirty state-
sanctioned currencies, including the Euro, Japanese Yen, Hong Kong Dollar, 
and the U.S. dollar via exchanges such as Mt.Gox.111 From a disruptive 
business model standpoint, Bitcoins may become a welcomed entrepreneuri-
al innovator in the micropayment (payments under $1 USD) space, by com-
peting with more well-known brands such as PayPal or iTunes112 based on a 
perception of “low transaction costs” involved with BitCoin-based transac-
tions.113 Even Boston University Distinguished Professor of Economics, 
Lawrence Kotlikoff,114 recently went so far as to suggest that Bitcoins 
should replace the dollar as the U.S. currency.115 
                                                                                                                         
110 Steadman, supra note 92; see also Plassaras, supra note 88, at 6. 
111 Teigland, Yetis, & Larsson, supra note 62, at 7. Based in Japan, Mt.Gox was the 
most widely used exchange as of this study period, with approximately 400,000 
transactions in U.S. dollars alone on a daily basis. Id. However, Mt. Gox filed for 
bankruptcy in early 2014 following several scandals. See, e.g., Andrew Peterson, 
Everything You Need to Know About the Latest Bitcoin Crisis, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 
2014 1:48 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/02/25/everyt 
hing-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-bitcoin-crisis/. Trading Bitcoins has become 
increasingly popular, and according to some unsubstantiated websites, has “surpass[ed] 
almost every financial asset over the past year, beating stock, gold, silver” and more. 
Forexminute Bitcoin Trading, FOREXMINUTE, http://www.forexminute.com/trade-bit 
coins (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). As of December 2012, the busiest Bitcoin exchange 
was Mt.Gox, handling approximately eighty percent of Bitcoin-dollar trades. Terms of 
Use, MT.GOX, https://mtgox.com/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). To use Mt.Gox purchasers 
and sellers are charged a commission on every transaction. MT.GOX, https://mtgox.com 
/terms_of_service (last visited, Feb. 24, 2014). Mt.Gox also charges to convert transactions 
at a “fixed commission of 2.5%.” Id. 
112 Other examples of micropayments include Facebook Credits, which was the currency 
used for games such as Farmville that generated a thirty percent commission for Facebook 
for all purchases made with Facebook credits. While Facebook credits became a failed 
currency experiment, other potentially competitive microcurrencies including gaming-related 
virtual currencies continue, and in May 2013, Amazon released “Amazon Coins” as a virtual 
currency to purchase apps and games. See Grinberg, supra note 63, at 171; Kelly Clay, 
Amazon Announces New Virtual Currency for Kindle Fire, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2013, 2:04 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyclay/2013/02/05/amazon-announces-new-virtual-currenc 
y-for-kindle-fire/. 
113 Grinberg, supra note 63, at 170. 
114 Laurence Kotlikoff, BOS. UNIV. PUB. REL., http://www.bu.edu/news/profiles/laur 
ence-kot likoff/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).  
115 Paul Solman, It’s No Bubble: Why We Should All Give Bitcoin a Chance, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Dec. 4, 2013, 12:13 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/its-n 
o-bubble-why-we-should-al/. 
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Further legitimizing Bitcoins is the meaningfully growing number of 
small businesses and online enterprises that have already begun accepting 
Bitcoin as an exchange medium—particularly as an alternative to credit and 
debit cards.116 In May 2010, Laszlo Hanyecz “sen[t] 10,000 [B]itcoins to a 
volunteer in the U.K.” who in exchange placed a call and had Papa John’s 
Pizza deliver a pizza to Laszlo making this the first ever Bitcoin transac-
tion.117 Further illustrating this point, several National Public Radio reporters 
exchanged their Bitcoins to transact with a New York City deli,118 a South-
ern California car dealer accepts BitCoins as consideration for automo-
biles,119 and a Las Vegas housing developer also accepts BitCoins.120 If vir-
tual currencies continue this momentum and become widely accepted, a 
substitution effect could occur, contrary to the desire of central bankers, 
which may explain the mid-August 2013 actions by Congress121 and New 
York’s Department of Financial Services,122 both demanding granular inves-
tigations of a currency that has existed for more than four years. 
To adherents of the Hayekian–Austrian–minarchist–libertarian view,123 
the government’s real concern and involvement in this matter likely results 
from governmental realization that increased Bitcoin use should result in de-
creased “real” currency (legal tender) use, thus hampering central bankers’ 
                                                                                                                         
116 Sarah E. Needleman, More Small Businesses Embrace Bitcoin, WALL ST. J. (June 
26, 2013, 7:27 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873233000045 
7855994138913138. 
117 Curt Hopkins, The Complete History of Bitcoin—The Revolutionary Currency, DAILY 
DOT (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.dailydot.com/business/bitcoin-complete-history-timeline/. 
118 The Tuesday Podcast: Bitcoin, NPR PLANET MONEY (June 12, 2011, 6:44 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/07/13/137795648/the-tuesday-podcasst-bitcoin. 
119 We Just Sold Our Very First Vehicle with Bitcoin as Payment!, LAMBORGHINI 
NEWPORT BEACH (Dec. 4, 2013), http://lamborghininewportbeach.blogspot.com/2013/12 
/we-just-sold-our-very-first-vehicle.html; Melanie Hicken, Someone Bought a $100,000 
Tesla with Bitcoins, CNN MONEY (Dec. 12, 2013, 11:49 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013 
/12/06/autos/tesla-bitcoin/index.html.  
120 Jennifer Robison, Home for sale: Asking $7.85 million, bitcoin welcome, LAS 
VEGAS REV. J. (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/home-sale-askin 
g-785-million-bitcoin-welcome. 
121 See Zachary Warmbrodt, Congress Starts Looking into Bitcoin, POLITICO (Aug. 
13, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/congress-starts-looking-in 
to-bitcoin-95464.html. 
122 See Timothy B. Lee, Congress Starts Investigating Bitcoin, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/13/congress-starts-i 
nvestigating-bitcoin/; Lawsky, supra note 89. 
123 Reuters not so kindly phrased Bitcoins users as “an odd assortment of uber-geeks, 
anarchists, libertarians, scammers, and forex [foreign exchange] traders.” Naomi O’Leary, 
Bitcoin, the City Traders’ Anarchic New Toy, REUTERS (Apr. 1, 2012, 7:01 PM), http://ww 
w.reuters.com/article/2012/04/01/traders-bitcoin-idUSL6E8ET5K620120401. 
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attempts to influence short-term interest rates.124 Such concern becomes 
particularly heightened during an era of massive government involvement 
favoring large financial institutions over middle class borrowers’ credit 
constraints, via three rounds of failed Federal Reserve quantitative eas-
ing.125 As a result, more than just e-businesses and delis want to be involved 
in virtual currencies; “[i]f the virtual currency seems to be taking off ... the 
banks want to be part of that.”126 It has been reported that Goldman Sachs 
and Morgan Stanley employees have “visit[ed] online Bitcoin exchanges as 
often as 30 times a day”127 and rumors exist that large U.S. financial institu-
tions are among the virtual currency investors.128 If Bitcoin represented a 
legitimate threat to legal tender, these financial institutions may be less like-
ly to feed from the government trough. Perhaps that explains why, in late 
                                                                                                                         
124 ECB Report, supra note 73, at 34. Central bankers can only impact the short term 
interest rates, that is, the short-end of the yield curve, which caused former Federal 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan to remark that his influence over short-term rates 
having no effect on intermediate interest rates was a “conundrum,” or, to many financial 
journalists a “riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma,” to quote Winston Churchill. 
Roger Craine & Vance L. Martin, Interest Rate Conundrum, B.E. J. MACROECON., Mar. 
2009, available at http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejm.2009.9.1/bejm.2009.9.1.1819/be 
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Greenspan’s Conundrum: A Riddle in a Mystery in an Enigma, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005. 
Central bankers’ control over interest rates and the money supply are so meaningful, 
because the interest rates serve in essence as the denominator for determining the present 
value of every global asset. 
125 See Ben S. Bernake, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Speech at the Stamp Lecture London School of Economics: The Crisis and the Policy 
Response (Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech 
/bernanke20090113a.htm; James D. Hamilton & Jing Cynthia Wu, Effectiveness of 
Alternative Monetary Policy Tools in a Zero Lower Bound Environment 37–38, 44–46 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 16956, 2011), http://www.nber.org 
/papers/w16956.pdf?new_window=1; Johathan H. Wright, What Does Monetary Policy Do 
to Long-Term Interest Rates at the Zero Lower Bound? 1, 8–9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper 17154, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17154.pdf. 
126 Andrew R. Johnson, Promise and Peril of Virtual Currencies, WALL ST. J. (May 
28, 5:33 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324125504578511 
\580913892620 (quoting Mercedes Kelley Tunstall) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
127 O’Leary, supra note 123. 
128 Id. (indicating that none of Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, or Morgan Stanley would 
respond to inquiries of whether they owned Bitcoins); Kamal El-Din, Goldman Sachs Shares 
Surge on Announcement of Bitcoin Trading Unit, UNCONFIRMED SOURCES, http:// 
unconfirmedsources.com/?itemid=6155 (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (indicating that 
Goldman Sachs’ shares rose on unsubstantiated rumors that Goldman was launching a 
Bitcoin trading desk). 
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July 2013, the SEC quietly charged an individual with violating federal 
securities laws with an alleged Bitcoin-related scheme.129 
Also, many individuals on the other side of the political continuum—
or Nolan chart—believe “Bitcoin is not going to fly because there is no 
central bank or power base. It’s doomed to fail.”130 The ECB noted, “[t]he 
fact that the founder of Bitcoin uses a pseudonym—Satoshi Nakamoto—
and is surrounded by mystery does nothing to help promote transparency 
and credibility in the scheme.”131 A 2012 ECB Report indicated the price 
and volatility of virtual currencies depended on four material factors:  
 
1. Money supply and issuer actions, regarding market intervention to maintain 
a fixed or semi-fixed exchange rate;  
2. Institutional conditions governing the virtual community;  
3. The virtual currency issuer’s reputation for meeting commitments; and  
4. A currency’s future value speculations and any history of cyber-attacks suf-
fered in the virtual community.132  
 
In addition to being affected by “credit, liquidity, and operational risk 
without any kind of underlying legal framework, [virtual currencies] are 
also subject to legal uncertainty and fraud risk....”133 Liberal economics 
                                                                                                                         
129 Complaint ¶¶ 6–7, SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex. 
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131 ECB Report, supra note 73, at 27.  
132 Id. at 38. 
133 Id. at 17. Cf. Quantitative Easing 1, 2, 3 and other Federal Reserve actions that impact 
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its crash. See Dirk J. Bezemer, “No One Saw This Coming”: Understanding Financial 
Crisis Through Accounting Models, MUNICH PERS. REPEC ARCHIVE PAPER NO. 15892 
(June 2009); Tim Swanson, Interview with Peter Schiff, MISES ECON. BLOG (Apr. 21, 
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/www.marketwatch.com/story/bear-stearns-hedge-fund-woes-stir-worry-in-cdo-market; 
MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, AMERICA’S GREAT DEPRESSION 7–12 (2011) (1962) (employing 
an Austrian/Misesan analytic in the 1960s to explain why a policy such as Quantitative 
Easing would not work). Having said that, other notable heterodox economists also 
indicated that a bubble formed and would burst. See generally Dean Baker, The Run-Up 
in Home Prices: Is It Real or Is It Another Bubble?, (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Research 
Briefing Paper, Aug 2002), http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/housing_200 
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Spark Serious Economic Downturn, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Sept. 3, 2007), 
http://www .wsws.org/en/articles/2007/09/econ-s03.html (representing a Marxian view). 
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Nobel laureate Paul Krugman previously indicated in scholarly writings that 
currency crises occur as a result of speculative attacks likely resulting from a 
risk combination of international reserve losses, current account deficits, fis-
cal and monetary expansions, and decreased price competitiveness.134 
C. Bubbles, Bitcoins, the Wild West, or Holland? 
1. Is Bitcoin a Fad, a Bubble, or Something Else? 
In late 2012, singer Alicia Keys introduced a song entitled Girl is on Fire, 
at the MTV Video Music Awards that subsequently hit number 5 on the 
charts.135 Evidencing Bitcoins’ impact on popular culture, within several 
months, a YouTube video parodied Ms. Keys’s song to belittle Bitcoin’s sta-
tus as a bubble,136 as demonstrated in the below chart. 
 
Bitcoin’s a fad 
And it’s on fire. 
Higher than a fantasy 
Like a singularity. 
Bulls living in world full of 
denial. 
I’m feeling a catastrophe. 
They’re thinking it can fly 
away. 
Ohhh, I keep on riding my 
bear. 
Though I’m falling a tear. 
Ohhh, it’s gonna crash to the 
ground. 
And I’m not backing down. 
Bitcoin is a Bubble. 
Bitcoin is a Bubble, ohh. 
It’s only a Bubble. 
Bitcoin is a Bubble, ohh. 
She’s just a girl 
And she’s on fire. 
Hotter than a fantasy. 
Lonely like a highway. 
She’s living in a world, and it’s 
on fire. 
Filled with catastrophe, 
But she knows she can fly away. 
Ohhhh, she got both feet on the 
ground. 
And she’s burning it down. 
Ohhhh, she got her head in the 
clouds. 
And she’s not backing down. 
This girl is on fire. 
This girl is on fire. 
She’s walking on fire. 
This girl is on fire.137 
                                                                                                                         
134 See Paul Krugman, A Model of Balance of Payments Crises, 11 J. MONEY, CREDIT 
& BANKING 311, 312 (1979); Paul Krugman & J. Rotemberg, Speculative Attacks on 
Target Zones, in TARGET ZONES AND CURRENCY BANDS 117 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1991). 
135 ALICIA KEYS, Girl Is on Fire, on GIRL ON FIRE (RCA Records 2012); see Alicia 
Keys Chart History, BILLBOARD, available at http://www.billboard.com/artist/278600/Ali 
cia+Keys/chart?f=381 (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
136 TheKoziTwo, “The Proundhon Song (Bitcoin Is a Bubble),” YOUTUBE (Apr. 7, 
2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A7TuFy0fcuw. 
137 Compare KEYS, supra note 135, with TheKoziTwo, supra note 136. 
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Gradually dispensing Bitcoins into the market is alleged to create more 
stability as opposed to “releas[ing] all 21 million Bitcoins at once,” which 
would be “more volatile.”138 In the beginning, to generate Bitcoins it was 
“ridiculously easy,” and a user could generate Bitcoins by using a “typical 
PC” that would only take “just a few hours.”139 As more and more people 
start generating Bitcoins, the difficulty level to generate the Bitcoins will 
increase.140 In addition, “[o]btaining the necessary computational power is 
easy, if expensive.”141 Additionally, “[a]n individual would need to spend 
around $600,000 (plus costs for supporting infrastructure) to control a ma-
jority of the processing power on the network.”142 A legitimate question 
arises then: if the level is hard and the computing power to mine so expen-
sive, why are hackers at schools such as the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (M.I.T.) not harnessing the vast computing power of that uni-
versity to enrich themselves or the university? 
2. Certain Risks Associated with Bitcoins 
“Bitcoin might undergo a deflationary spiral that causes certain indi-
viduals or industries to abandon Bitcoin, possibly causing a panic or just a 
permanent depression in Bitcoin’s value.”143 “The end result of such a spiral 
is underemployed human capital and other means of production and de-
struction of wealth.”144 Thus, deflationary pressures may impact Bitcoins 
more than traditional currencies.145 Those who favor a regulatory state have 
asserted that “[b]ecause digital currencies like Bitcoin lack regulation or 
public oversight, they are subject to credit, liquidity, and operational risks, 
as well as risk of fraud.”146 Other risks exist as well. 
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139 Nakamoto, supra note 99. 
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145 ECB Report, supra note 73, at 25 (“If ... the number of Bitcoin users starts growing 
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2014] KICKSTARTER MY HEART 519 
For example, evidence of computing risk has occurred, as “Bitcoin tro-
jan horses already exist.”147 In addition, cyber-attacks have doubled from 
2010 to 2012.148 Mt.Gox indicated that hackers have targeted the exchange 
“to ‘destabilise Bitcoin’ ... [and] abuse the system for profit.”149 When 
“Mt.[]Gox, the most popular exchange, was hacked .... [t]he glut of 
bitcoins for sale crashed the price from $17.50 to $0.01 within a half 
hour.”150 The company said, “Attackers ... wait for everybody to panic-sell 
their Bitcoins, wait for the price to drop to a certain amount ... and start 
buying as much as they can.”151 In late 2010, the Bitcoin system had to fix 
a “vulnerability in the system” found when the creation of nearly 185 bil-
lion Bitcoins resulted from a verification error and again when an inter-
governmental task force wrote that terrorist groups may use digital assets 
such as Bitcoin.152 
Such linkage to international criminal activity may represent a material 
risk for Bitcoins, as well. In 2011, Silkroad, which was an illegal market-
place for crimes with victims, began permitting Bitcoins as a currency 
medium.153 In 2012, more controversy arose: a major market, Tradehill, 
closed;154 two additional markets—Bitcoinica and Bitfloor—were 
hacked;155 an FBI report became leaked, reporting that the FBI “fears[ed] ... 
Bitcoin as a tool to facilitate the sales of drugs and weapons and assist ter-
rorists;”156 the closing of “Bitcoin savings and trust” creating “$5.6 million 
in debt;”157 and clients sued Bitcoinica for the alleged loss of deposits.158 As 
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a result, “users are anxious about Bitcoin’s legal status and the possibility 
of a government crackdown.”159 
Bitcoinica’s ultimate folding prompted a $460,000 lawsuit against 
Bitcoinica, allegedly founded by 17-year-old Singaporian Zhou Tong, 
whose platform permitted for shorting Bitcoins, and whose platform alleg-
edly suffered from a cyber-attack in which hackers purportedly stole more 
than 40,000 Bitcoins.160 One author described this situation as “a story that 
will sound familiar to anyone who has been following the saga of the 
fledgling currency and its nascent economy, a digital Wild West where 
bad actors routinely take advantage of inexperienced buyers and sellers in 
the absence of a sheriff.”161 
Volatility risks exist, because “no fixed exchange rate between 
Bitcoins and regular currencies” exists.162 In addition, other disruptive 
risks, besides alternate virtual currencies, exist for Bitcoins, such as com-
peting transaction logs. In March 2013, Mt.Gox had two separate transac-
tion logs for a time and, while the competing logs lasted for only several 
hours, the Mt.Gox exchange halted activity and Bitcoins’ price plummeted 
from $48 to $37.163 Disruptions may also occur to the international 
FOREX markets.164 
Another recurring theme arises as to whether virtual currencies, such 
as Bitcoins, represent a form of a Ponzi scheme. These claims arise be-
cause virtual currency holders initiate their holdings by purchasing 
Bitcoins with traditional currencies; however, virtual currency holders 
may only leave the scheme and retrieve their funds in traditional curren-
cies if other interested parties want to buy the selling party’s virtual cur-
rency holdings (i.e., if other people join the scheme).165 
3. Analyzing Arguable Madness of Crowds and Bitcoin Bubbles 
One Bitcoin trader indicated that approximately nine of ten traders 
were purchasing digital assets such as Bitcoin in hopes of capitalizing on 
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fast and material returns.166 Bitcoin has experienced hugely volatile market 
pricing to date. For example, early on the currency reflected a near-trivial 
market price.167 Specifically, in May 2010, a Bitcoin’s market price was 
$0.005 until hitting $30 per Bitcoin in June 2011 (a 600,000 percent in-
crease) prior to plummeting to $2 that October.168 By early 2013, Bitcoin’s 
market price continued to demonstrate extreme volatility, causing con-
cerns that the market is creating a “bubble.”169 Another author indicated:  
The scale of the recent boom-and-bust has been staggering indeed. At the 
start of the year, a Bitcoin was worth $13.51. Earlier this week, it traded as 
high as $266. And on Thursday, it plummeted to less than $100, as one of 
the exchanges where Bitcoins are traded closed temporarily.170 
Evidencing this extreme volatility in the Bitcoin currency market is the 
currency’s recent price movements in 2013. For example, during the five-
month period from February 2013 to June 2013, Bitcoins’ market price 
went from the $20 range to the $220 range, back to the $20 range, to the 
$120 range as of early June 2013.171 Subsequently, the price was near 
$1,200 on December 5, 2013 (nearly the extant market price of gold), pri-
or to collapsing below $600 during the next 48 hours before rising to ap-
proximately $830 by the week ending December 6, 2013.172 In May 2013, 
the Wall Street Journal indicated that the market price of Bitcoins “has 
gone through some wild spikes in value this spring.”173 As of April 2013, 
Bitcoins’ market price totaled approximately 1.6 billion U.S. dollars, 
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which exceeded the FOREX price for “the entire currency stock of over 30 
countries, including Niger, Belize, and Rwanda.”174 
In a cyber-attack on June 20, 2011, the value of a Bitcoin dropped 
“from USD 17.50 to USD 0.01 within minutes.”175 An ECB chart demon-
strated how an “immature and illiquid currency can almost completely 
disappear within minutes, causing panic to thousands of users.”176 Bitcoin 
“daily transactions” have risen “from 1,000 in early 2011 to roughly 
50,000 today.”177 As of February 2014 approximately 12,296,825 Bitcoins 
were in circulation.178 This volatility and increase in trading volume has 
led several authors to compare the Bitcoin situation to the tulip-bulb situa-
tion of the Dutch East India company.179 
D. Legal, Regulatory, and Other Enforcement Mechanisms? 
U.S. regulators are beginning to focus on Bitcoin, saying it “is for sure 
something we need to explore,” according to Bart Chilton, one of five 
commissioners from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.180 In 
March 2013, the U.S. Treasury Department stated that all businesses which 
engage in “the exchange or transfer of [Bitcoin] will be considered ‘mon-
ey services businesses.’”181 The founder of Bitcoinstore.com, Roger Ver, 
claimed to know that some entrepreneurs had relocated to Panama in order to 
escape the reach of the American legal and regulatory system.182 Also, 
“[e]ven if US regulations make it hard for Bitcoin businesses to operate in the 
                                                                                                                         
174 Plassaras, supra note 88, at 13. 
175 ECB Report, supra note 73, at 26. 
176 Id. 
177 Spittler, supra note 98.  
178 Total Bitcoins in Circulation, BLOCKCHAIN, http://blockchain.info/charts/total-bitcoins 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
179 See, e.g., Blodgett, supra note 167 (stating that Bitcoin might be the “next tulip 
bulb or dotcom stock bubble.”); Sivy, supra note 170 (comparing Bitcoins to the tulip 
bulb mania due to the “volatile rise-and-fall of Bitcoin[s]”); Radford, supra note 52 
(asserting that the tulip bulb could “hold[] important lessons for economists and 
sociologists—and maybe bitcoin investors as well”). 
180 Tracy Alloway, Gregory Meyer & Stephan Foley, US Regulators Eye Bitcoin 
Supervision, FIN. TIMES (May 6, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/b810157c-b651-11e 
2-93ba00144feabdc0,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com% 
2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2Fb810157c-b651-11e2-93ba-00144feabdc0.html&_i_referer=http%3 
A%2F%2Fsearch.yahoo.com%2Fsearch%3Ffr%3Dmcafee%26p%3DUS%2Bregulators%2
Beye%2BBitcoin%2Bsupervision#axzz2c9fIQc2P/. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
2014] KICKSTARTER MY HEART 523 
US, that doesn’t mean it will make it difficult for people to use Bitcoin as a 
currency in the US. Bitcoin is a world currency,” he told the Financial Times.183 
A recent Reuters article stated that “Bitcoin poses a puzzle for [Euro-
pean] regulators”184 and “[t]he situation in the United States is even more 
complex,”185 where a recent law review article indicated that “[m]ost im-
portantly, Bitcoin currently operates in a legal grey area.”186 Some critics 
have likened Bitcoin to a currency equivalent of PayPal for criminals,187 and 
others—approximately 217,000 hits’ worth on a Google search in August 
2013188—have called Bitcoin a “Wild West”189 type of finance. Senator 
Charles Schumer of New York “declared [B]itcoin ‘an online form of mon-
ey laundering used to disguise the source of money.’”190 Moreover, doctoral 
candidate and Yale master’s degree holder in religion, Gabriel J. Michael 
recently wrote, that “most actors in the virtual world operate under condi-
tions of anarchy .... [and] [w]hen we fail to recognize the anarchic nature of 
the virtual world, we come to fundamentally incorrect conclusions about 
how best to think about that world.”191 Michael accused “legal scholars [of 
being] far too sanguine about the ability of states to regulate the virtual 
world,” because of Michael’s belief in “legal academia’s tendency to over-
emphasize legislation and formal rules, while underemphasizing other fac-
tors that influence actors’ behavior....”192 Despite Michael’s self-professed 
expertise despite apparently lacking any educational degree in law or any 
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bar passage in any nation in the world, and while understanding that bubbles 
can occur with or without government interference, the idea of a lawless 
Wild West deserves exploration in this Article relative to potential regulato-
ry solutions. This section details some potential regulatory problems in the 
U.S., and a synthesized proscriptive proposal occurs below in Part IV. 
Having said that, Bitcoin is not really run by anyone or anything as it is 
not organized under a central authority;193 the absence of a central orga-
nizing body may render Bitcoin particularly difficult to shut down.194 Some 
scholars have asserted that Bitcoins represent intangible private property 
and reflect neither a contract nor debt owed among parties.195 This section 
attempts to review potential regulatory instruments available in the U.S., 
relative to Bitcoins, that could attempt to prevent risk and bubbles. 
Inquiries as to what statutory and regulatory schemes may apply to 
Bitcoins appear to demonstrate that Bitcoins and virtual currencies generally 
escape any material existing regimes. This section analyzes many, but cer-
tainly not all, of those potential schemes. 
1. Anti-Counterfeiting Measures? 
The U.S. Constitution assigns “control over currency to Congress to 
the exclusion of states.”196 But, as one author indicated, “[t]he Constitu-
tion has nothing to say about private parties creating money.”197 In the re-
cent Liberty Dollar private currency conviction, the Justice Department 
asserted that creating private currency systems seemingly violates some 
vague and non-specific federal law.198  
Community currencies exist, however, including the more well-known 
Ithaca Dollars, which “have avoided any legal attack under [counterfeiting 
laws or the Stamp Payments] Act by creating notes only in values greater 
than $1.”199 “[I]n United States v. Gellman, the [district] court warned that 
early money-related laws providing criminal penalties should be cautiously 
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applied to new technologies.”200 But relative to counterfeiting, material 
questions exist as to whether “[a]s a threshold matter, the statutes under 
which NotHaus [Liberty Coin] was convicted, 18 U.S.C. §§ 485 and 486, 
are inapplicable to Bitcoin because they only deal with metal coins or 
coins or bars that resemble official U.S. or foreign currency.”201 
2. Stamp Payments Act of 1862? 
One author indicated that “[i]n the nineteenth century, inflation caused 
the metal in ... coins to become more valuable than the face value of the 
coins themselves .... Companies used privately issued currencies in the form 
of notes or tokens in small denominations.”202 Attempting to prevent pri-
vate currencies from arguably contributing to inflationary pressures,203 
Congress enacted the Stamp Payments Act of 1862,204 of which Section 2 
prohibits currencies with face values less than $1 to circulate, and whose 
policy basis is to prohibit competition with the nation’s official currency.205 
While some people believe that virtual currencies may be subject to the 
Stamp Payments Act due to transactions occurring in digital assets or alt-
coins for $1 or under, legitimate questions of enforcement exist. Evidencing 
the enforcement problem is that the Stamp Payments Act has not been ad-
dressed by the courts in a published opinion in over one hundred years.206 
3. U.C.C. Article 4A and Electronic Funds Transfer Rules? 
Unlike in the Uniform Commercial Code’s (U.C.C.’s) universe, no trans-
parent issuer exists for a Bitcoin-based payment system.207 In addition, most 
payment systems rely on common law, contractual underpinnings, legislation, 
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and other codes to dictate the parties’ respective rights and obligations.208 
Nonetheless, some researchers have argued that Bitcoin represents a payment 
system, albeit one without express contracts or centralized rules.209 
Article 4A of the U.C.C. defines a payment order as “an instruction of 
a sender to a receiving bank, transmitted orally, electronically, or in writ-
ing, to pay, or to cause another bank to pay, a fixed or determinable 
amount of money....”210 The U.C.C., however, limits the scope of its pay-
ment system through intermediary banks.211 As a result, it appears unlikely 
that U.C.C. Article 4A applies to Bitcoins. When I spoke with noted 
U.C.C. author Douglas J. Whaley—Professor Emeritus at The Ohio State 
University Moritz College of Law—regarding how Bitcoins might fit into 
a U.C.C. world, his response was that they do not and that the rules of the 
so-called “Wild West” apply.212 
Supporting the ideas that the rules of the “Wild West” apply to 
Bitcoins, Kaplanov discussed a number of other current laws, rules, and 
regulations that seemingly fail to encapsulate sufficient authority to permit 
U.S. government regulation of alt-coins, crypto-currencies, or digital as-
sets.213 These failures appear to include money transmitter licensing 
laws,214 electronic funds transfer (EFT) laws and regulations,215 common 
law contract law’s relation to legal tender,216 local currencies,217 sellers 
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attempting to use self-created coins similar in appearance to U.S. legal 
tender, such as the Liberty Dollar,218 securities regulation,219 and commod-
ities regulation.220 Kaplanov acknowledged, however, that some rules 
governing foreign currency trading may ensnare Bitcoins.221 
In addition, Bitcoins avoid many of the problems taught in commercial 
paper and payment systems courses, because Bitcoins can generally “ensure 
that the coin hasn’t been stolen, and that it hasn’t already been spent or 
transferred to someone else.”222 In the event of a dispute with proper own-
ership in Bitcoins, the best and longest record prevails because of the peer-
to-peer networked approach; further, Bitcoin’s payment and transaction 
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political economy by discouraging the flow of capital to large, more environmentally 
destructive business organizations,” id. at 215, and explains that:  
[l]ocal currency involves the use of a medium of exchange other than 
national currency to obtain goods and services. For example, simple 
barter between individuals is a form of local currency. Other forms of 
local currency seek to overcome the lack of flexibility inherent in a 
traditional barter system which requires a direct swap of goods or 
service between people.  
One such system is the Ithaca HOURS system, which utilizes a paper 
currency in which one HOUR has a value of ten dollars—the average 
hourly wage in Ithaca, New York. Local businesses and individuals 
wishing to participate in the Ithaca HOURS system need only agree to 
accept the HOURS in full or partial exchange for goods and services. 
Thus, by use of the Ithaca HOURS, participants in the program agree to 
patronize local businesses which, in turn, reinforces trading among 
people who live within the community. This program benefits 
individuals, businesses, and the community. 
Id. at 1230 (internal citations omitted). 
218 18 U.S.C.A. § 485 (West 2014) (leading to prosecution and conviction of Liberty 
Dollar Services, Inc.’s currency creator, Bernard von NotHaus). 
219 Discussed in detail infra Part  III. For now, see Securities Act of 1933 (Securities 
Act), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(q) (West 2014); Securities Exchange of 1934 (Exchange Act), 15 
U.S.C.A. § 78(j) (West 2014); SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
220 Discussed in detail infra Part  II.D.4. 
221 Kaplanov, supra note 74, at 131–50. 
222 Bollen, supra note 61, at 277. Cf. “Holder in Due Course” issues under U.C.C. § 3-
302 (2004). Bitcoin also avoids note and draft encumbrances such as determining the 
validity of a financial instrument when an allonge of prior holders is affixed to the 
original promissory note via a staple versus a paper clip. See, e.g., Douglas J. Whaley, 
Mortgage Foreclosure, Promissory Notes, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 W. ST. 
U. L. REV. 313, 319 (2013). 
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recording system is primarily maintained using cloud-based technology.223 
While some people may initially scoff at a decentralized recordkeeping ap-
proach, such payment systems in many ways reflect smart cards.224 
4. Commodities Statutes and Regulations Promulgated by the CFTC? 
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) regulates de-
rivatives contracts. Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),225 which was passed in 2010 to 
“promote the financial stability of the United States by improving ac-
countability and transparency in the financial system”226 in response to the 
subprime mortgage crisis and financial crisis of 2007–2010,227 the CFTC 
has authority to oversee retail foreign exchange dealers. The CFTC’s ju-
risdiction does not extend to cash markets unless there are derivative con-
tracts based on cash.228 Thus, Bitcoins generally should not be subject to 
CFTC jurisdiction, but leveraged Bitcoin transactions settled in more than 
two days—generally known as “rolling spot” transactions—appear to be 
under the CFTC’s jurisdiction.229 Bart Chilton, a CFTC regulator, stated, 
“[i]n essence, we’re talking about a type of shadow currency, and there is 
more than a colorable argument to be made that derivative products relat-
ing to Bitcoin falls squarely within our jurisdiction.”230 Assuming that one 
can take seriously a federal agency whose director pushed to pass the so-
called “Eddie Murphy Rule,”231 a quick glance at the commodities rules 
shows regulatory coverage of Bitcoin to be questionable. One author indi-
cated that “[B]itcoin could also be classified as a commodity and its ex-
change a commodity futures contract. Commodities are goods sold in the 
                                                                                                                         
223 Bollen, supra note 61, at 277. 
224 See What is a Smart Card?, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://www.howstuffworks.com/ 
question332.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (describing how a smart card contains a 
microprocessor that uses a “limited instruction set for application such as cryptography” to 
store data; smart cards are said to avoid the need for “extensive online mainframe-based 
networks for verification and processing” because all the card’s data is secured by the 
microprocessor). 
225 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
226 Id. 
227 Steven J. Markovich, The Dodd-Frank Act, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
(Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/united-states/dodd-frank-act/p28735#p1. 
228 See Alloway, supra note 180, at 2. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
231 See Statement of Hon. Gary Gensler, supra note 58. 
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market of uniform quality and value throughout the world.”232 However, 
the CFTC retains exclusive jurisdiction over “accounts, agreements ..., and 
transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery 
... subject to regulation by the Commission.”233 
But as discussed above234, challenges exist in stating with any reason-
able certainty what constitutes a commodity. For example, the Court de-
fined futures contracts as “agreements to buy or sell a specified quantity of 
a commodity at a particular price for delivery at a set future date.”235 Thus, 
a futures contract, which memorializes in the present a transaction to take 
place in the future, is distinguishable from a forward contract, which has 
been defined as “a contract for a present transaction with future deliv-
ery.”236 In addition, “the delivery of [B]itcoins between users is nearly in-
stantaneous and well outside of the requirements for future delivery.”237 
So while the CFTC may regulate a certain degree of commodities futures 
contracts, and foreign currency contracts executed on a leveraged basis,238 
little evidence supports the theory that Bitcoin transactions, even on a lev-
eraged basis, would come under the purview of the CFTC. 
5. Securities Laws? 
Securities laws are described in greater detail in Part III dealing with 
crowdfunding and Kickstarter, but the Supreme Court has stated: 
[T]he fundamental purpose undergirding the Securities Acts is ‘to elimi-
nate serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market.’ ... Con-
gress therefore did not attempt to precisely cabin the scope of the Securi-
ties Acts. Rather, it enacted a definition of ‘security’ sufficiently broad to 
encompass virtually any instrument that might be sold as an investment.239 
Therefore, it is critical that a determination is made as to whether Bitcoins 
qualify as securities to be regulated under the Securities Acts. Some commen-
tators have “concluded that digital currencies are unlikely to be regulated as 
                                                                                                                         
232 Kaplanov, supra note 74, at 125. 
233 Id. at 27 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
234 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
235 Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465, 470 (1997). 
236 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Erskine, 512 F.3d 309, 322 (6th Cir. 2008). 
237 Kaplanov, supra note 74, at 147–48 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(C)(i)(II) (2010)) 
(stating in essence that delivery must be outside a three-day window to come under 
CFTC regulatory authority). 
238 Presumably under 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(c)(2)(C)(i)(I) (West 2014). 
239 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60–61 (1990) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
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securities,”240 and that should Bitcoins represent a security, it will be because 
Bitcoins fall “within the vague and broad phrase ‘investment contract.’”241 
This argument’s basis is that the Court in the famed Howey decision inter-
preted an investment contract as a security if four prongs were satisfied in 
which a person “[1] invests his money in [2] a common enterprise and [3] is 
led to expect profits [4] solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party 
....”242 Thus, “[t]hose arguing that a [B]itcoin is not a security may also argue 
that [B]itcoins … are commodities.”243 
But “securities ... have a feature that commodities do not have: they 
confer a claim on some other entity,”244 because “[a]ll securities repre-
sent claims against an issuer….”245 Yet, 
decisions explaining why commodities are not securities have also 
noted that commodities are “tangible” and have “inherent value,” un-
like securities. Bitcoins are not “tangible,” and one may argue that by 
design they have no inherent value because there is no government or 
commodity backing them. Furthermore, just as one generally cannot 
“use” a security—except by buying, selling, or pledging it—one can-
not “use” a [B]itcoin—except by buying, selling, or pledging.246 
As an author indicated, “although [B]itcoins share many features 
with commodities, they also share features with securities and are unlike-
ly to evade categorization as an ‘investment contract’ on this ground.”247 
The OCC’s exemptions from the definition of “security” appear to save 
Bitcoin from regulation, because Bitcoin is not a “note, draft, bill of ex-
change, or bankers acceptance….”248 Also, some authors have argued that 
despite excluding currencies from the definition of securities, some curren-
cies may also be securities, because currencies may be, not a “medium of 
                                                                                                                         
240 Id. at 195 (referencing Kerry Lynn Macintosh, How to Encourage Global 
Electronic Commerce: The Case for Private Currencies On the Internet, 11 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 733, 746 n.49 (1998)). 
241 Id. at 196. 
242 Id. (citing SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946)). 
243 Id. at 199. 
244 Id. 
245 RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY, & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE 
LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 130 (Aspen Publisher, Inc., 4th ed. 
2008). Cf. U.C.C. § 3-105(c) (defining “issuer” as relates to “instruments”). 
246 Grinberg, supra note 63, at 200. 
247 Id. 
248 See 12 C.F.R. § 344.3(m)(5) (2014). 
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exchange” but instead “current money.”249 Investors can engage in lever-
aged trading of or shorting Bitcoin.250 
According to Tiegland, Yetis, and Larsson, the Bitcoin Foundation is 
an approved 501(c)(3) entity by the Internal Revenue Service, with Naka-
moto listed as a founding member, along with a five-person corporate 
board.251 Corporate governance concerns are beyond this article’s scope, 
but the foundation’s five board seats are voted by different voting classes, 
based on annual membership classes based on costs, which are, of course, 
denominated in Bitcoins.252 Corporate members of the Bitcoin Foundation 
include Mt.Gox, bitcoinstore (U.S.), bitinstant (New York), CoinLab (Se-
attle), BITHOC (Florida), Cryptex (Kansas), the Newport Beach Company 
(U.S.),253 zipbit (New Zealand), and eCardOne (Czech Republic).254 
6. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956? 
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956255 does not cover Bitcoins or 
its exchanges as a banking institution. The Federal Reserve Board similarly 
appears to lack authority.256 Many state banking laws also are similarly lack-
ing, employing a hodgepodge of definitions regarding what constitutes a 
bank.257 As The Economist indicated, “[u]nlike traditional currencies, which 
are issued by central banks, Bitcoin has no central monetary authority.”258 
In terms of banking regulation, the U.S. regulatory scheme for banks is 
more fragmented than other G20 nations,259 thereby leaving a hodgepodge 
of inconsistent and messy regulations at both state and federal levels. For 
                                                                                                                         
249 Grinberg, supra note 63, at 203 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 
2009) and State v. Quackenbush, 98 Minn. 515, 520–21 (1906), respectively). 
250 Teigland, Yetis, & Larsson, supra note 62, at 8 (quoting Ron Finberg, A Closer Look 
at Coinsetter and its Bitcoin ECN Trading Platform, FOREX MAGNATES (Apr. 26, 2013), 
http://forexmagnates.com/a-closer-look-at-coinsetter-and-its-bitcoin-ecn-trading-platform/). 
251 Id. at 10–11. 
252 Id. at 10. 
253 Id. at 11–12. But cf. Craig Trudell, Bitcoin Meets Tesla with Lamborghini 
Dealership’s Model S Sale, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 7, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/2013-12-06/bitcoin-meets-tesla-in-california-dealership-model-s-transaction.html 
(discussing sale of Tesla Model S using Bitcoins).  
254 Teigland, Yetis, & Larsson, supra note 62, at 11–12. 
255 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(a)(1)-(6) (West 2014). 
256 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.2 (2006) (Regulation Y); Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve 
Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 363 (1986). 
257 Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1304.01 (West 2013) (adopting the U.C.C. 
definition in § 4-105) with N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-2-3 (West 2012) (applying federal 
definition in 12 U.S.C. § 1813(h) (2011)) and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-307 (West 2013) 
(applying the federal Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)). 
258 Standage, supra note 104. 
259 Bollen, supra note 61, at 285–87. 
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example, Singapore’s rapidly developing economy is subject to a single 
regulatory agency, which includes oversight of both banking and insur-
ance.260 In the U.S., in addition to the myriad regulators, definitions of 
banking also differ. 
7. U.S. Coinage Act of 1965? 
The U.S. Coinage Act of 1965 states that U.S. “coins and currency (in-
cluding Federal Reserve notes ...) are legal tender for all debts, public charg-
es, taxes, and dues. Foreign gold or silver are not legal tender for debts.”261 
This suggests that the U.S. Coinage Act of 1965 also is inapplicable to alt-
coins, crypto-currencies, and other digital assets such as Bitcoins. 
8. Foreign Exchange (FOREX) Instruments? 
Simply put, “foreign currencies are generally not considered to be a se-
curity.”262 As one author asserted, “[b]ecause Bitcoin is not formally backed 
by a country’s government, it is not bound by the IMF’s guidelines. As a 
result, Bitcoin poses a serious threat to the economic stability of the foreign 
currency exchange if it continues to grow in both value and usage.”263 
Seemingly confirming that FOREX is not applicable, a person must ex-
change the currency of one or more countries to be considered a dealer in 
foreign exchange.264 Because Bitcoins are not a foreign currency repre-
senting legal tender of any nation, the U.S. foreign exchange laws and 
regulations do not appear to apply to Bitcoins and virtual currencies. 
9. Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Laws? 
Several laws aimed at targeting alleged terrorist financing activities may 
apply to Bitcoins or the exchanges, including the Money Laundering Control 
Act of 1986 (MLCA).265 The MLCA subjects persons to criminal sanctions 
for conducting or attempting to conduct, with knowledge of the unlawful 
origin of the property in the financial transaction, financial transactions 
                                                                                                                         
260 Id. at 289. 
261 31 U.S.C.A. § 5103 (West 2014). 
262 Kaplanov, supra note 74, at 161 (citing Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, 
What Is A Security Under the Federal Securities Laws?, 56 ALB. L. REV. 473, 483 (1993)). 
263 Plassaras, supra note 88. 
264 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(1) (2012). 
265 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (West 2014). 
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“which in fact involve[] the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.”266 Addi-
tionally, the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and the related regulations promulgated 
by FinCEN collectively subject money transmitting or servicing businesses to 
potential criminal or civil penalties for their failure to register with Fin-
CEN.267 Failing to register may subject international persons to liability so 
long as affected persons are located in the United States.268 In March 2013, 
using authority granted under the BSA,269 FinCEN issued interpretive guid-
ance on “virtual currencies,” which seem to cover Bitcoin.270 FinCEN’s 
guidance expressly acknowledged the flaw articulated in this Section; that 
is, FinCEN’s comments “should not be interpreted as a statement by Fin-
CEN about the extent to which those activities comport with other federal or 
state statutes, rules, regulations, or orders.”271 While providing some clarifi-
cation specific only to FinCEN’s position on virtual currencies, the lack of a 
consistent or coherent broad scheme of regulatory definitions, norms, and 
understandings led to FinCEN’s interpretive guidance adding to the confu-
sion surrounding the subject. 
                                                                                                                         
266 Id. The MLCA contributed to the decimation of E-Gold. See Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Digital Currency Business E-Gold Pleads Guilty to Money Laundering 
and Illegal Money Transmitting Charges (July 21, 2008), available at http://www.justice 
.gov/opa/pr/2008/July/08-crm-635.html. 
267 31 U.S.C.A. § 5330(a)(1) (West 2014) (“Any person who owns or controls a money 
transmitting business shall register the business (whether or not the business is licensed as a 
money transmitting business in any State)” with FinCEN). See also Amendment to the 
Bank Secrecy Act Regulations—Definitions Relating to, and Registration of, Money 
Services Businesses, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,438, 45,438 n.1 (Aug. 20, 1999) (to be codified at 31 
C.F.R. pt. 103); 31 C.F.R. § 1022.380 (2006). 
268 See, e.g., Bank Secrecy Act Regulations; Definitions and Other Regulations 
Related to Money Services Businesses, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,585, 43,588 (July 21, 2011) (to 
be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1021, 1022) (indicating that a person qualifies as a 
money services business (MSB) because of its activity in the U.S. and asserting that 
“[t]his proposal arose out of the recognition that the Internet and other technological 
advances make it increasingly possible for persons to offer MSB services ... from foreign 
locations.”); Press Release, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN Clarifies 
Money Services Business Definitions: Rule Includes Foreign-Located MSBs Doing 
Business in U.S. (July 18, 2011), http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/nr/pdf/20110715.pdf.  
269 Treas. Order 180-01, supra note 14. 
270 FinCEN Guidance FIN-2013-G001, supra note 15. The Guidance attempted to “clarify 
the applicability of the regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy Act (‘BSA’) to persons 
creating, obtaining, distributing, exchanging, accepting, or transmitting virtual currencies. 
Such persons are referred to ... as ‘users,’ ‘administrators,’ and ‘exchangers’ …. A user of a 
virtual currency is not an MSB under FinCEN’s regulations and therefore is not subject to 
MSB registration, reporting, and recordkeeping regulations.” Having said that, “an 
administrator or exchanger is an MSB under FinCEN’s regulations,” and “[a]n administrator 
or exchanger is not a ... dealer in foreign exchange, under FinCEN’s regulations.” Id. 
271 Id. at 1 n.1. 
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For example, FinCEN provides four definitions for currency (referred to 
by FinCEN as “real currency”),272 virtual currencies,273 “centralized convert-
ible virtual currencies,”274 and “[d]e-centralized convertible virtual curren-
cies,”275 that seem to encompass Bitcoins. Specifically, FinCEN stated:  
In contrast to real currency, “virtual” currency is a medium of exchange 
that operates like a currency in some environments, but does not have all 
the attributes of real currency. In particular, virtual currency does not have 
legal tender status in any jurisdiction. This guidance addresses “converti-
ble” virtual currency. This type of virtual currency either has an equivalent 
value in real currency, or acts as a substitute for real currency.276 
Furthermore, FinCEN stated that the rules that apply to brokers and 
dealers of e-currency and e-precious metals are the same as those that ap-
ply to brokers and dealers of real currencies “since the definition of a 
money transmitter does not differentiate between real currencies and con-
vertible virtual currencies….”277 
Essentially, what this dictate means is that persons who either broker 
or conduct an exchange in Bitcoins are subject to FinCEN regulation as 
an MSB, but typical purchasers and sellers would not be subject to Fin-
CEN regulation.278 
10.  Other Federal Regulators? 
In early 2014, just weeks after Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet 
Yellen indicated in response to a U.S. senator’s letter to U.S. financial regu-
lators279 that Bitcoins could not be regulated by the Fed “in any way,”280 
                                                                                                                         
272 Id. (defining currency or “real” currency as “the coin and paper money of the 
United States or of any other country that [i] is designated as legal tender and that [ii] 
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274 Id. at 4. 
275 Id. at 5. 
276 Id. at 1. 
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278 Bollen, supra note 61, at 285–86. 
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Treasury, et al. (Feb. 26, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Man 
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Any Way, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2014, 12:43 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014 
/02/27/yellen-on-bitcoin-fed-doesnt-have-authority-to-regulate-it-in-any-way/. Chairwoman 
Yellen stated, “To the best of my knowledge there’s no intersection at all, in any way, 
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New York State sought to regulate crypto-currencies via a “BitLicense” to 
regulate virtual currency exchanges.281 The statements by Senator Manchin 
and by the New York Department of Financial Services appear to be politi-
cal posturing when the explicitly apolitical Federal Reserve282 has taken a 
different position. 
E. Synthesis 
Rhys Bollen asserted that “[m]ost regulatory regimes are not well de-
signed to cater” to a decentralized peer-to-peer payment system and sug-
gested a regulatory regime that is broad, outcomes-focused, and technolo-
gy neutral.283 The problem, however, is that financial engineers will 
always be ahead of regulation, and regulation will then attempt to over-
regulate to make up for the initial lack of regulation and to cast a broad net 
to catch as much potentially future conduct as possible.284 Such a policy is 
not wise when dealing with economic activities in which efficiency should 
be maximized and frictional costs minimized, so long as harmed parties 
may seek redress. 
One potential action would simply be a requirement for exchanges to 
pay premiums to a third-party insurer of the exchange’s choice (i.e., a pri-
vatized and competitive model of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC) for banks or the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
(PBGC) for defined benefit pension plans). Persons wishing to participate 
in any voluntary transaction can choose the exchange they wish based on a 
number of factors including best execution, reputation, trading volume, as 
well as the insurer of the exchange. Requiring mandatory insurance for 
voluntary financial transactions is far more similar to states requiring au-
tomobile drivers to purchase insurance than it is to mandating the purchase 
                                                                                                                         
between Bitcoin and banks that the Federal Reserve has the ability to supervise and regulate. 
So the Fed doesn’t have authority to supervise or regulate Bitcoin in anyway.” 
281 Press Release, N.Y. State Dep’t. of Fin. Servs., NYDFS Issues Public Order on 
Virtual Currency Exchanges (Mar. 11, 2014), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about 
/po_vc_03112014.htm; Paul Vigna, Lawsky’s Office Starts Taking Applications for the 
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http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12799.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014); Thomas 
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284 See, e.g., IRS Notice 2014-21, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf (taxing 
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of insurance for individual health care. Moreover, insurance of this type 
continues to support a broad array of experimentation and incubation 
among insurers, exchanges, and parties, in terms of transactions, rather 
than dictating that all definitions and policies be dictated by a single regu-
latory body, such as in Singapore.285 
The most active Bitcoin Forum member identified by Tiegland, Yetis 
and Larsson was Phinnaeus Gage, who “founded and ... maintains 
Bitcoin100, a kickstarter for non-profits that implement a Bitcoin donation 
option onto their websites.”286 Additionally, no story would be complete 
without the famed Winklevoss twins, portrayed in the film The Social 
Network as the co-founders of Facebook duped by Mark Zuckerberg.287 
Sure enough, in early 2013, the Winklevoss twins announced the launch of 
a hedge fund in Bitcoins.288 Thanks to finally enacted and much delayed 
rules by the SEC, violating the timing of its enabling statute,289 hedge 
funds like the Winklevoss’s can now advertise any way they would like 
for financing their venture to any potential investor, including on crowd-
funding portals such as Kickstarter. 
III. CROWDFUNDING, KICKSTARTER, AND COMMISSION CONSTRAINTS 
Crowdfunding provides financial capital to individuals and small busi-
ness ventures by crowdsourcing individual investors via the world wide 
web, without traditional financial intermediaries or underwriters.290 Crowd-
funding has been defined as “the practice of funding a project or venture 
by raising many small amounts of money from a large number of people, 
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typically via the Internet.”291 Another definition stated that crowdfunding 
“emerged as [a] novel way for entrepreneurial ventures to secure funds 
without having to seek out venture capital ....”292 Having said that, crowd-
funding remains a relatively unknown subject to academia, despite the 
enormity of the practice.293 Nonetheless, entrepreneurs may engage in four 
types of crowd-funding: 
 
1. donation-based, which permits investors, or “donors,” to invest in a project 
without receiving (or expecting) a return from the project creator;  
2. reward-based, which sanctions investors, or “contributors,” to contribute 
capital to project creators in return for a nominal reward worth less than the 
investment given;  
3. equity-based, which permits certain investors to provide capital in return for 
a stake in the company or dividend; and  
4. debt-based (sometimes referred to as “peer-to-peer (‘P2P’) lending” or, at 
times, “microlending”), which allows many lenders to loan small monetary 
amounts to borrowers.294 
 
Congress broadly defined crowdfunding in the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012 295 as “Capital Raising Online,”296 a bill that 
President Obama called “a potential game changer” for small businesses 
and start-ups.297 Crowdfunding has the potential to help entrepreneurs as-
suage the challenges of obtaining—and the associated friction costs of 
raising—startup capital. While crowdfunding may represent an approach 
better suited for today’s technological environment, due to securities laws 
and regulations, crowdfunding is only partially disruptive to traditional 
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debt and equity capital campaigns, and funding from the crowd comes in a 
variety of flavors. 
A. Reward and Donation-Based Crowdfunding 
1. Reward-Based Crowdfunding 
Reward-based crowdfunding generally entails raising capital to fund 
some sort of creative project from which contributors receive some form 
of reward, tangible or otherwise, in exchange for contributions that reach a 
certain monetary benchmark.298 Because investors only receive non-
monetary perks—such as the goods funded by the capital, a credit in a 
crowdfunded film or television production, or an opportunity to meet with 
an actor from that production—reward-based crowdfunding is more of 
“goodie-bag” crowdfunding.299 With no expectation of a financial return, 
reward-based capital providers essentially pay for whatever the goodie bag 
entails.300 Doing so avoids the scope of current securities laws and SEC rules 
and regulations, which do not govern reward-based crowdfunding because a 
goodie bag does not constitute a “security.”301 Reward-based crowfunding 
platforms include Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and Rockethub. Kickstarter and 
Indiegogo are the two most popular reward-based crowdfunding platforms, 
although many other platforms exist throughout the world.302 
Kickstarter uses an “all or nothing” funding strategy from which pro-
ject creators receive contributed funds only if the project creator’s defined 
funding goal is met, within a set time period.303 Indiegogo permits project 
creators to receive any funds contributed, without having to meet a set 
monetary funding goal.304 In 2012, approximately 2.2 million people from 
177 countries pledged approximately $319.8 million to fund a total of 
18,109 projects through Kickstarter.305 Ten percent of films submitted to 
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the 2012 Sundance Film Festival also received funding via Kickstarter.306 
Further, in March 2013 the Veronica Mars Movie Project generated ap-
proximately $2 million, reaching the project’s funding goal, within the 
first 11 hours of the campaign being posted on Kickstarter.307 Subsequent-
ly, more than 91,000 backers contributed amounts totaling approximately 
$5.7 million within the 30-day time period.308 Project creators have also 
enjoyed a significant amount of success crowdfunding through Indiegogo. 
For instance, an 18-year-old film director raised almost $6,000 on Indie-
gogo in just a couple days after previewing a trailer of her movie, “My 
Sucky Teen Romance,” at a comic book convention.309 
Reward-based crowdfunding platforms, however, suffer from consid-
erable drawbacks.310 For example, because raising capital via crowdfunding 
is available to the public, such access can adversely impact project creators 
in several ways. First, crowdfunding provides information to third parties 
regarding how much capital an entrepreneur raised. Second, a failure to 
deliver on a successfully crowdfunded project may result in negative con-
sequences for the project creator, including a loss of reputational capital.311 
Nonetheless, even though crowdfunding entails many risks for both 
the contributor and the entrepreneur, crowdfunding continues to surge in 
popularity. In 2013, crowdfunding is expected to raise $5.1 billion global-
ly—far more than the aggregate market for virtual currencies.312 
2. Donation-Based Crowdfunding 
Donation-based crowdfunding typically involves raising funds for some 
social cause from which donors receive no tangible return. Donation-based 
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funding platforms include: (1) Gofundme, (2) Razoo, and (3) Crowdrise. 
Investors provide capital but do not receive anything in return for their 
contribution other than feelings of goodwill. The charitable donations, 
however, may fund for-profit enterprises.313 Since donors receive no con-
sideration, donation-based crowdfunding does not fall under the purview 
of the SEC regulations and rules promulgated thereunder.314 
B. Debt-Based Crowdfunding 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending is a debt-based form of crowdfunding that 
uses an online platform to connect borrowers with individual lenders. P2P 
lending has generated billions of dollars in loans during a time when con-
sumers and small businesses “faced reduced access to credit from banks and 
credit unions.”315 P2P lending platforms have revolutionized community 
lending by providing “searchable electronic marketplaces, standardized loan 
contracts, borrower creditworthiness data, and loan servicing,” and generat-
ing large volumes of small loans between anonymous individuals.316 
Microloan concepts are nearly as historical as metal coinage, since mi-
croloans have appeared in fourth-century China (lun hui), and at other times 
and places, such as Ghana (susus), India (chit funds), Mexico (tandas), Bo-
livia (pansanaku), and Bangladesh (the Grameen Bank in the 1970s).317 
The Internet has created an environment for P2P microlending. As 
Paul Slattery describes, “[f]or borrowers, P2P lending platforms offer debt 
consolidation, increased access to liquidity, and significantly less racial 
and sexual discrimination than traditional lenders.”318 For lenders, P2P 
lending platforms offer accessible portfolio diversification and socially 
conscious investing. Lenders involved in the P2P lending model provide 
short-term funds and expect repayment.319 
Since traditional lenders generally intend to bundle and securitize 
loans, certain borrowers may be overlooked either because the borrower 
has an “unusual profile” or because the borrower poses a credit risk. P2P 
lenders, on the other hand, have an opportunity to lend to these overlooked 
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borrowers based on the intrinsic monetary value of the loan or based on 
purely social value (i.e., philanthropy). 
P2P lending also has drawbacks. For borrowers, these platforms may 
create privacy risks. P2P platforms collect and store large amounts of per-
sonal data, including credit and identification information.320 P2P plat-
forms can also sell borrower information or hackers can steal borrower 
information as a result of P2P platforms implementing inadequate infor-
mation security systems.321 For lenders, the major risk is the fact that the 
borrower can default—much like traditional loans. Additionally, the P2P 
lender runs the risk of losing money if borrowers do not pay back enough 
of the loan to generate interest. 
Some platforms only provide a return of the principal of the loan to the 
lender.322 Other platforms provide interest on the funds investors loan to 
borrowers.323 Thus, P2P lending platforms are differentiated into two cat-
egories, those from which lenders receive no interest and those from 
which lenders receive interest.324 
1. Non-Interest Bearing MicroLoans 
Kiva is considered the leading “non-interest bearing” platform.325 In-
stead of lending to entrepreneurs directly, Kiva partners with “field part-
ners,” which include international microfinancing institutions and non-profit 
organizations.326 Kiva posts entrepreneur loan requests on the Kiva web-
site.327 Individual lenders can loan any amount, from $25 to the full request-
ed amount, through the Kiva website.328 Kiva collects and distributes the 
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funds the individual lender agrees to loan back to the field partners, credit-
ing lenders with any repayments the entrepreneur makes.329 Lenders receive 
payment of the principal and the field partners use any interest to cover op-
erating and transactional costs.330 Since lenders do not receive any interest 
and Kiva.org is a non-profit organization, Kiva.org remains free from SEC 
regulation.331 
2. Interest-Bearing Microloans 
Both Prosper and Lending Club dominate the market with respect to 
interest-bearing debt-based crowdfunding.332 These platforms provide an 
online marketplace that allows potential borrowers to anonymously seek 
individual loans. Prospective borrowers make the case to receive funding 
by posting narratives and consent to be subjected to a credit check.333 Po-
tential creditors (lenders) browse the debtors’ applications and fund loans 
at platform-determined interest rates.334 Paul Slattery states that “[b]oth 
platforms contract with an FDIC-insured bank to execute loans, and both 
issue notes to lenders dependent on borrower payment streams.”335 Debt-
ors request loans ranging from $2,000 to $35,000 and lenders can agree to 
loan a monetary amount as low as $25.336 Originally, debtors issued prom-
issory notes directly to creditors on both crowdfunding platforms, while 
the site maintained “custody of the notes and service[ed] [the debts] for a 
1 % fee.”337 Now, creditors directly buy notes issued by either Prosper or 
Lending Club, and the funds from those purchases are used by both sites 
to make loans through WebBank.338 These platforms reduce the costs of 
extending credit by eliminating “unnecessary ... services ... associated with 
traditional intermediaries.”339 
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In lieu of a service fee, Prosper and Lending Club charge debtors an 
origination fee for each lending transaction.340 The amount of the origina-
tion fee is proportional to the perceived credit risk for each borrower, taking 
into consideration factors such as credit scores.341 Lending Club determines 
the debtor’s “loan grade” and assigns an interest rate for each loan accord-
ingly.342 Lending Club measures the debtor’s credit risk by evaluating the 
debtor’s loan application and credit history.343 Alternatively, Prosper rates 
each loan to set a minimum rate but an auction-like process determines the 
actual interest rate assigned to the loan.344 Generally, P2P lenders provide 
loans to borrowers having difficulty obtaining credit through traditional 
channels.345 Crowdfunded interest-bearing microloans are subject to securi-
ties regulation.346 
C. Equity Crowdfunding and Associated Restrictions 
Because only one type of crowdfunding provides an unlimited upside 
return on an investment as well as internal governance control mecha-
nisms,347 the most meaningful crowdfunding type is equity crowdfunding. 
Further, equity-based crowdfunding comprises about 15 percent of the to-
tal crowdfunding market and raised the most funds per project, as com-
pared to donation and reward-based crowdfunding.348 
The JOBS Act aimed to create jobs, in part, by incentivizing investors to 
finance entrepreneurial small business ventures through allowing capital 
contributors to receive a financial interest without registering the offering 
with the SEC.349 The JOBS Act arguably represented a means of facilitating 
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opportunities for middle class investors, entrepreneurs, and workers to bene-
fit from an ease in the exchange of capital among parties. 
When an entrepreneur exchanges an equity interest in their start-up for 
cash investment, a potential problem exists because the entrepreneur seek-
ing capital may have issued “securities.”350 Congress passed the JOBS 
Act, at least in part, to facilitate equity crowdfunding.351 Instead of choos-
ing to employ debt financing, an entrepreneur can seek capital from inves-
tors who, in exchange for their investment in the startup, receive an equity 
interest in the startup.352 Obtaining outside financing can be a challenging 
proposition.353 The frictional costs of raising outside capital can be high, 
both in terms of financial and governance give-ups, including board seats, 
to the venture capital investors.354 Until September 2013, a prohibition ex-
isted on businesses engaging in solicitation of securities to the general 
public (general solicitation).355 With this prohibition removed, one may 
initially and intuitively believe that equity crowdfunding might disrupt or 
even replace traditional equity financing mechanisms. But such a belief is 
in large part misplaced. 
The Crowdfund Provision “authorizes the ‘crowdfunding’ of securities, 
defined as the sale of unregistered securities over the Internet to large num-
bers of retail investors, each of whom only invests a small dollar 
amount.”356 The Crowdfund Provision provides an exemption allowing the 
issuance of unregistered securities.357 Such an exemption lowers the barriers 
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to entry for small businesses to obtain equity capital by: (a) lowering agency 
costs associated with acceding to mandatory SEC registration and disclo-
sure requirements; (b) lowering marketing and promotional costs tradition-
ally correlating with issuing equity to the public; and (c) increasing the ease 
of obtaining equity capital by small businesses.358 
Yet meaningful equity-based crowdfunding remains currently available 
only to accredited investors.359 Broadly speaking, an accredited individual 
investor is a natural person whose: (a) net worth exceeds $1 million; or 
(b) individual annual income exceeds $200,000.360 As Professor Usha 
Rodrigues wrote, “[s]ecurities law’s dirty little secret is that rich investors 
have access to special kinds of investments ... that everyone else does not 
.... [T]he law assumes that the average investor needs the protection of 
the full panoply of securities regulation and thus should be limited to 
buying public securities.”361 
Unaccredited investors are not permitted to participate in equity-based 
crowdfunding until the SEC passes appropriate rules and regulations, pursu-
ant to the JOBS Act; when the SEC will do so is anyone’s guess. Section 
201 of the JOBS Act required the SEC to “revise its rules” with respect to 
the ban on Regulation D [Section 506] solicitations “not later than 90 days” 
after the enactment of the Act.362 That did not occur until July 2013, more 
than 365 days later than required by the JOBS Act.363 These changes, effec-
tive September 2013, permit for so-called general solicitation of securities to 
anyone.364 Only accredited investors, however, may actually invest in the 
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enterprises that advertise using general solicitation.365 While the SEC re-
leased proposed equity crowdfunding rules in October 2013, these proposed 
rules asked numerous questions, and no one is certain when, or if, the equity 
crowdfunding rules will become effective, thus permitting small investors 
and enterprises to exchange equity for financial capital. 
Also, section 108 of the Act required the SEC “[n]ot later than 180 
days after the date of enactment of this title” to issue such rules as may be 
necessary to carry out the amendments contained in section 301 of the 
JOBS Act.366 While individuals face penalties for violating the securities 
laws, the SEC faces no penalty for failing to fulfill certain obligations con-
tained in these and various other portions of the JOBS Act.367 In addition, 
“[b]y law, the SEC cannot revisit the actual definition of accredited investor 
status until 2014,”368 and the JOBS Act limits the amount that entrepre-
neurs can raise via crowdfunding at $1 million,369 and this amount fails to 
include the proposed material legal and accounting compliance costs. 
These restrictions are unproductive for entrepreneurs, middle-class in-
vestors, workers, and the economy as a whole. First, the restrictions harm 
entrepreneurs because the constraints limit capital, lowering amounts to 
numbers far below what traditional equity investments can provide. In addi-
tion, should the business raise more than $1 million in crowdfunded equity, 
it faces potential liability under the Securities Act.370 Furthermore, the en-
trepreneurial firm may not crowdfund more than $1 million in any twelve-
month period. For example, game console developer Ouya crowdfunded 
approximately $950,000 in eight hours on Kickstarter.371 What legitimate 
policy rationale could exist to prevent that company from crowdfunding 
additional capital? 
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Second, these provisions do not help individual middle-class investors, 
as those investors may only provide $2,000 in crowdfunded capital (if 
those investors have a financial net worth below $100,000) or ten percent of 
an investor’s financial net worth, should the investor have a financial net 
worth between $100,000 and $999,999.99.372 No meaningful reason exists 
to cap what an individual saves, spends, gives away, or invests to a particu-
lar entity based on an arbitrary appraisal of a concept as slippery as “net 
worth.”373 By restricting the equity crowdfunding contributions in these 
ways, the so-called JOBS Act374 does not help businesses create many pos-
itive net present value projects that would lead to a growth in the jobs base 
or an expansion of the productions possibilities frontier for the economy 
as a whole.375 
A proffered reason for the securities regulations that act as crowdfunding 
constraints is to avoid potential investor fraud,376 so as to keep with the 
                                                                                                                         
372 See Edward T. Swanson, Crowdfunding and the Sale of Securities, CENTURY CITY 
LAWYER (Apr. 2012), http://centurycitybar.com/newslettertemplate/April12/article3.htm. 
373 Rodriques, supra note 368, at 41. 
374 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 
306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Cf. the freedoms 
removed by the similarly misnamed USA PATRIOT Act. Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
(USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, 50 U.S.C.). While aimed at 
increasing the security of Americans following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the 
USA PATRIOT Act authorized unprecedented levels of domestic surveillance, among other 
infringemens on freedoms. John Fund, Sensenbrenner: NSA Surveillance is Abuse of Patriot 
Act, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 19, 2013, 12:04 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/3561 
59/sensenbrenner-nsa-surveillance-abuse-patriot-act-john-fund.  
375 See, e.g., Harvey Leibenstein, Entrepreneurship and Development, 58 AM. ECON. 
REV. 72, 72 (1968) (advancing as a Harvard professor a non-neo-classical economic theory 
(X-efficiency theory) that “entrepreneurship is a significant variable in the development 
process” and describing the production possibilities frontier to entrepreneurship); see also 
Sander Wennekers & Roy Thurik, Linking Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth, 13 
SMALL BUS. ECON. 27, 32, 35, 38–42, 49 (1999) (synthesizing three important concepts: (i) 
indicating that while Austrian economic theory permitted for entrepreneurship, neo-
classical economic theory left no room for entrepreneurship to exist because of the neo-
classical assumption that perfect competition eliminates any profit opportunities potentially 
remaining for entrepreneurs; (ii) demonstrating the impact of laws, rules, and policy 
instruments on entrepreneurial development throughout history, and (iii) linking 
entrepreneurship with economic growth and national advantage) (referencing MICHAEL E. 
PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990)). Cf. David Kennedy, supra 
note 10 (regarding law and economic development in new economies). 
376 Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the 
Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on 
Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (2012). 
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SEC’s oft-repeated policy to protect the interests of the public investor.377 
Some high-ranking members of the SEC take their nanny-statism quite seri-
ously. For example, SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar wrote that he op-
posed loosening constraints for individual non-accredited investors.378 Agui-
lar asserted that removing those obstacles to middle-class investment in equi-
equity crowdfunded startups via general solicitation, such as Kickstarter, 
would “come at the expense of investors and place investors at greater 
risk.”379 Aguilar continued, “without additional protections, general solicita-
tion makes fraud easier and enforcement more difficult .... [and] [e]xperience 
tells us that this will lead to economic disaster for many investors.”380 
While Commissioner Aguilar’s experience may tell him hyperbolically 
of many forthcoming economic disasters as a result of the easier fraud and 
increased risk that will occur when bureaucrats afford the slightest increase 
in freedom to middle-class equity crowdfunders, the empirical data related 
to unregulated crowdfunding—as opposed to Commissioner Aguilar’s 
experience—tells otherwise. Specifically, Wharton Professor Ethan Mol-
lick examined metadata including approximately 48,500 crowdfunded pro-
jects that raised over $237 million.381 All of these projects were patronage 
                                                                                                                         
377 To demonstrate a long history of propaganda hoping to convince people of the 
acceptability and necessity of government’s institution of coercive laws and policies to 
protect people from themselves, see generally, Andrew Downey Orrick, Commissioner, 
SEC, Address Before the San Francisco Bond Club: Current SEC Program to Protect 
Public Investors (Dec. 5, 1955), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1955/120555orrick.pdf 
(“This Commission is determined to use its vast regulatory powers to protect the public 
investors….”); The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains 
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (describing “[t]he 
mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain 
fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation .... [O]ur investor 
protection mission is more compelling than ever .... As our nation’s securities exchanges 
mature into global for-profit competitors, there is even greater need for sound market 
regulation.”); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PROTECTING INVESTORS (2005), http://www 
.sec.gov/about/secpar/secparsumm04.pdf (articulating the SEC’s vision as “[strengthen[ing] 
the integrity and soundness of U.S. securities markets for the benefit of investors and other 
market participants, and conduct its work in a manner that is as sophisticated, flexible, and 
dynamic as the securities markets it regulates”). 
378 Luis A. Aguilar, Facilitating General Solicitation at the Expense of Investors, 
HARV. L. BLOG, FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 11, 2013, 9:07 AM), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/07/11/facilitating-general-solicitation-at-the-e 
xpense-of-investors/. 
379 Id. 
380 Id. (emphasis added).  
381 Mollick, supra note 290, at 1. 
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or reward-based crowdfunding,382 and all projects were funded on Kick-
starter, which is “the largest and dominant crowdfunding site.”383 
Like Bitcoin, Kickstarter started in 2009.384 As mentioned earlier, 
Kickstarter has no intermediary besides itself.385 Additionally, Kickstarter 
has no enforcement mechanism for funded entities that fail to deliver their 
promised goods.386 As a result, a number of similarities exist between 
Bitcoin and Kickstarter. Mollick acknowledged that “[f]or the dishonest, 
[crowdfunding] creates an opportunity for fraud.”387 Yet, of these many 
Kickstarted projects he studied, Mollick found that fraud was “very rare.”388 
Although a number of projects delivered their goods on a delayed basis, 
only $21,324 of contributed capital failed to receive a response from the 
funded entity.389 Mollick asserted that “[f]or crowdfunding intermediaries 
and policy makers, there are also clear implications.... [T]he rate of fraud 
in crowdfunding is currently very low,” though that may not remain so in 
the future or in all crowdfunding forms.390 
From the perspective of using policy and legal instruments to hinder 
entrepreneurial growth, Commissioner Aguilar’s nanny-statism was based 
on his “experience,” rather than informed by evidence created specifically 
for policymakers. More broadly, the government’s lingering and numerous 
restrictions on equity crowdfunding seem particularly poorly chosen for 
middle-class entrepreneurs, investors, job-seekers, employees, and the 
economy as a whole. 
As a result, middle-class investors are thus relegated to receiving essen-
tially goods with no governance rights, while the wealthy or high-income 
accredited, so-called “sophisticated,” and institutional investors retain the 
ability to receive the lion’s share of any equity return and any associated 
governance rights with funding the venture, pushing the entrepreneur to a 
less influential role. As a result, the unsubstantiated popular delusions of 
fraud that led to the madness of crowdfunding constraints continue to favor 
large businesses and wealthy or high-earning individual investors over en-
trepreneurs, their enterprises, their potential middle-class investors, their 
                                                                                                                         
382 Id. at 3. 
383 Id. at 4. 
384 Id. See also Nakamoto, supra note 99. 
385 Bradford, supra note 300, at 16–18.  
386 Mollick, supra note 290, at 12. 
387 Id. at 11. 
388 Id. 
389 Id. 
390 Id. at 14. 
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potential future employees, and the nation’s potential future economic 
growth. This ultimately harms the crowd in the name of protecting it. 
IV. A HETERODOX PROSCRIPTIVE PROPOSAL FOR A PLURALISTIC PARLEY ON 
THE PARADOX 
Thus far, this Article has demonstrated that both Bitcoins and Kick-
starter as respective virtual currencies, and crowdfunding platforms share 
the following characteristics. First, both virtual currencies and crowdfund-
ing represent Internet-based mediums of consideration exchange.391 Se-
cond, both exchanges involve over $1 billion annually, with crowdfunding 
exchanges representing approximately $3 billion more per year than virtu-
al currencies.392 Third, neither platform features any intermediary besides 
itself.393 Fourth, a strong potential exists that future crowdfunding plat-
forms will accept Bitcoins or other virtual currencies.394 Fifth, middle-
class investors lack any meaningful governance rights when investing in 
either Bitcoins or a Kickstarter-backed entity.395 Yet, despite these opera-
tional similarities, a striking paradox exists relative to the government’s 
ability to insert itself in entrepreneurial development, post–Great-
Recession economic redevelopment. 
Specifically, despite their volatile boom-to-bust bubbles that have demon-
strably harmed those who speculated in Bitcoins, recent attempts to em-
ploy weak—and beyond exchange registration under FinCEN—tangential 
enforcement instruments relative to virtual currencies demonstrate that 
virtual currencies essentially are above the law and escape regulation in 
today’s U.S. economy.396 In contrast, the initial empirical data on unregu-
lated crowdfunded entities suggest that no material fraud or risk to capital 
providers exists.397 Yet, the SEC’s response to the JOBS Act’s mandate of 
                                                                                                                         
391 See supra Part  II.C. 
392 Compare Plassaras, supra note 88, at 13, with MASSOLUTION, supra note 293. 
393 See Steadman supra note 92; Mollick supra note 290, at 2. 
394 See, e.g., Bitcoin Crowdfunding on Max Keiser’s PirateMyFilm.com, HOW TO 
ACCEPT BITCOIN (Aug. 30, 2012), http://www.howtoacceptbitcoin.com/2012/08/bitcoin-
crowdfunding-on-max-keisers.html. 
395 See supra Part  III.C and accompanying text. These corporate governance rights are 
lacking for most investors, because most are middle-class, non-accredited, non-
sophisticated, and non-institutional investors whose ability to invest in a project’s equity 
is capped by securities regulation, leaving believers in a project who still want to 
contribute capital relegated to goodie bag consideration, lacking any governance rights to 
control the funded enterprise. This reality appears to be a poor use of regulatory 
instruments from a policy perspective. 
396 See supra Part  II.C. 
397 See Hazen, supra note 376, at 1737. 
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general solicitation and to thoughts of permitting the average investor to 
equity crowdfund entities (thus securing some control rights) has been de-
layed, paternalistic, and devoid of evidence in the name of “protecting” 
the investor from “risk.”398 
A. Why Employ an Acerbic Model of Economic Heterodoxy as the 
Article’s Analytic Supporting this Article’s Proposal? 
Admittedly, much of this Article’s reliance on a Hayekian-Austrian 
economic analytic legitimately could cause the reader to believe that this 
Article represents nothing more than the modern manifesto of a radically 
capitalistic libertarian. That is not the case, however. Any of the diverse 
heterodox economic theories—ranging from Marxian to post-Keynesian to 
Austrian to Sraffian to behavioral, among others399—theoretically could 
have served as the lens through which this Article challenges the neo-
classical economic assumptions that have served as the basis on which 
U.S. economic and monetary policy have rested for decades.400 
Although heterodox economics may have multiple understandings—
whether methodologically, ontologically, epistemologically, or pedagogi-
cally401—most heterodox economic branches seek a common pluralism402 
because they are outside of mainstream orthodox, neo-classical economic 
thought.403 To reach a common pluralism, each heterodox economics strand 
                                                                                                                         
398 See supra note 378 and accompanying text. 
399 I employed some of these in prior research analyses both within and outside this 
Article. See, e.g., supra Part  II.C.3. (discussing behavioral economics and applying it to 
Bitcoins); Dylan P. Grady, Charter School Revocation: A Method for Efficiency, 
Accountability, and Success, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 513 (2012) (quoting David Groshoff, 
Uncharted Territory: Market Competition’s Constitutional Collision with Entrepreneurial 
Sex-Segregated Charter Schools, 2 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 307, 308 (2010)). 
400 See, e.g., Frederic S. Lee, The Emergence of Heterodox Economics, 1990–2006, 
ASS’N FOR HETERODOX ECON, available at http://www.hetecon.net/division.php?page=ab 
out&side=history_of_heterodox_economics (derived from FREDERIC S. LEE, A HISTORY OF 
HETERODOX ECONOMICS: CHALLENGING THE MAINSTREAM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
ch. 10 (2009)); Andrew Mearman, Who Do Heterodox Economists Think They Are?, 70 
AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 480, 480 (2011) [hereinafter Mearman, Heterodox Economists]; 
ANDREW MEARMAN, TEACHING HETERODOX ECONOMIC CONCEPTS 3–4 Figure 2 (2007). 
401 Andrew Mearman, Pluralism and Heterodoxy: Introduction to the Special Issue, 1 
J. PHIL. ECON. 5, 5–10 (2008) [hereinafter Mearman, Pluralism]. 
402 Id. at 12–13. This Article sprinkled pluralistic views of both heterodox and neo-
classical economists in its early material. See, e.g., supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
403 See, e.g., Barkley Rosser, Jr. et al., How Can Something so Right as Heterodox 
Economics Have so Little Influence?, 7–8, 11–13 (Sept. 12, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://cob.jmu.edu/rosserjb/Friendly%209%2012%2012%20final 
.docx (representing the writings of three orthodox neo-classical economists, stating “[w]e 
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includes its unique embrace of some, though not all, of the following de-
scriptive understandings that clash with neo-classical economic theory: (1) 
human actors are social and less than perfectly rational; (2) economic sys-
tems are complex, evolving, and unpredictable; (3) individual economic ac-
tor theories are useful generally, and theories of the economic collective are 
useful for outcomes particularly; (4) human and economic history provide 
important understandings to the contemporary relevance of economic 
events; (5) all economic theories are fallible; (6) formal mathematical and 
statistical methods do not necessarily represent the supreme method; and (7) 
the importance of power404 relative to determining economic outcomes.405 
Thus, despite acknowledging other economists and economic theories 
throughout, this Article’s primary reliance on the Hayekian-Austrian lens 
occurred because I believed this analytic represented the heterodox theory 
that is the most directly applicable analytic to this research subject matter. 
Specifically, Hayek’s Nobel prize-garnering theory arose from his work 
involving the interdependence of: (1) money (e.g., virtual currencies and 
arguably securities); (2) social phenomena and economic fluctuations 
(e.g., crowds and bubbles); and (3) institutional phenomena (e.g., govern-
ments, laws, rules, policies, instruments, and financial institutions);406 syn-
thesized with (4) the general Hayekian view of what may occur in a free 
and unregulated market (e.g., Bitcoins’ ex-ante status when this Article’s 
research began and, generally speaking, Bitcoins’ current ex-post status). 
These reasons explain why this Article applied the often caustic analytic 
of the Hayekian-Austrian heterodoxical economic model to the extant eco-
nomic and legal environment. The Article aimed to arrive at a pluralistic 
proscriptive framework seeking to engage other heterodox economic, legal, 
and financial scholars in a dialogue. Also, the dialogue is an attempt to find 
a logical common ground regarding inconsistent government application of 
its instruments to emerging entrepreneurial economic (re)development ac-
tivity following the U.S. Great Recession and during global economic crises 
                                                                                                                         
identify orthodoxy with a belief in the trinity of assumptions of rationality, greed, and 
equilibrium represented by ‘neoclassical economics’ as taught in most textbooks” and 
describing their view of heterodox impact on public policy). 
404 Cf. David Kennedy, Speaking Law to Power: International Law and Foreign Policy 
Closing Remarks, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 176, 177–78 (2005) (differentiating yet coupling 
“[l]aw in the interstices of power, law as an instrument of government, as a compliance 
program and management tool,” and inquiring, “[h]ow can we translate the terms used by 
policy managers into the vernaculars of left-center-right, or of social interests, that we 
might contest the decisions experts take in political terms....”) (emphasis added). 
405 Mearman, Heterodox Economists, supra note 401, at 489. 
406 See The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 
1974, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureat 
es/1974/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
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in the Western nations of Greece, Spain, Cypress, in addition to other strug-
gling, developing, or redeveloping national economies. 
B. Economic Failures Exist Regardless of Regulation 
As Professor Christine Hurt asserted this year, relative to the law and 
economic bubbles and collapses in 2001 (post-Internet bubble) and 2008 
(post-housing bubble), “state and federal laws are not good at criminaliz-
ing foolishness, even foolishness with other people’s money,”407 in part 
because “individuals have different appetites for risk.”408 Professor Hurt 
acknowledged that additional disclosure via SEC or agency rules would 
“not be necessarily helpful information”409 to investors, given that a dis-
closure regime already existed during the economic collapse. Further, Hurt 
explained that investors “were turned away from the courthouse door in 
cases involving federal securities law claims and claims of breaches of 
state law fiduciary duties,”410 but that imposing additional risk-
management duties relative to legal, currency, business, and other risks is 
impractical and would result in eliminating the business judgment rule.411 
When regulated, political pressures often determine who gets sued or 
prosecuted and why or why not,412 and Professor Hurt paints a picture of 
stunning incompetence and potential caving to political pressure by the 
SEC in the wake of the Great Recession’s multiple regulatory viola-
tions.413 Securities violations may be subject to civil, criminal, or adminis-
trative penalties.414 Penalties for computer related crimes exist as well,415 
beyond those discussed above in Parts II and III. Answers are not always 
found through additional or amplified statutes and regulatory schemes. 
C. A Market-Based Minarchist-Statutory Proposal 
Because the Hayekian view does not seek to protect people from 
themselves, but recognizes the need to add a pragmatic-based theory based 
                                                                                                                         
407 Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk 6 (Ill. Prog. in Law, Behav. & Soc. Sci., 
Working Paper No. LBSS14-09, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=2308007. 
408 Id. at 42. 
409 Id. at 44. 
410 Id. at 45. 
411 Id. 
412 Id. at 9–12, 10 n.45. 
413 Id. 
414 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k (West 2014); § 77l (civil enforcement); § 78i (same); § 78j 
(same); § 77x (criminal enforcement); § 78ff (same). 
415 18 U.S.C.A. § 3571 (West 2014); § 1030(c)(2)(B)(i) (including accessing or 
obtaining information from a financial institution used in interstate or foreign commerce). 
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on current structural regimes to achieve a pluralistic dialogue, this section 
acknowledges that risk-reduction for individual investors is economically 
beneficial. This section proposes a modestly brief statutory requirement 
that narrowly borrows from unnecessarily broader schemes such as those 
enabling the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which serve as mandatory insurers 
of banks and defined benefit pension plans, respectively, with the banks 
and pension plans having to make mandatory premia based on govern-
ment-determined risk premia. 
This Article’s proposal, however, is to assuage middle-class persons 
defrauded by a virtual currency exchange or a crowdfunding platform in a 
minimally intrusive way relative to the economy’s ability to act in as free 
of a market as possible. 
Therefore, rather than mandate that virtual currency exchanges and 
crowdfunding platforms pay the cost of potential future risk to a new regu-
latory agency, this Section proposes something much simpler: a requirement 
that any exchange or platform show proof of insurance from a private insur-
ance provider—not an agency like FDIC or PBGC—on the entity’s website. 
Such a requirement would be similar to the requirement of certain states’ 
enabling legislation, which mandate benefit corporations to post verification 
on their business’ websites. 
1. Perceived Benefits 
With this additional yet limited information, the potential capital con-
tributor can then evaluate both the capital project itself, as well as the risk 
associated with the insurance for its investment. Each exchange or plat-
form could choose an insurer of its choice, rather than pay a bureaucratic 
agency. Further, one may suspect that similar to traditional insurers, the 
insurers engaged in this business would also receive third-party ratings 
that may help capital contributors choose which insured exchange or plat-
form to use. In addition, just as virtual currency exchanges have begun to 
work together relative to self-regulation, one may envision a mutualized 
insurer created and owned by the exchanges and crowdfunding platforms 
themselves. The choice to be mutualized or demutualized would reside 
with the virtual currency exchange or the crowdfunding platform. 
2. Anticipated Costs 
Any government interference in the marketplace creates a cost. Here, 
the cost must be passed to the contributor of capital or to the entrepreneur. 
As a result, the proposed statute must contain a requirement that the prior 
one through five years’ of premiums be refunded to the virtual currency 
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exchange or crowdfunding platform, plus interest at the (arguably) market-
based prime rate, at the insurer’s discretion at the start of the coverage 
when the policy becomes bound. The remedy for a harmed party by an 
insurer’s failure to return funds would be a civil suit by the exchange or 
platform, because the protected risk is, of course, that of the individual 
investor, who would be paid by the insurer for any fraudulent conduct. 
3. How to Reduce Anticipated Costs of this Individual Investor Risk 
Reduction 
The insurer would have to return this amount to each investor, but in-
surers tend to understand how to remain long-term cash-flow positive, typi-
cally via a combination of appropriate actuarial premium pricing and dura-
tion matching of fixed-income securities. The five-year window described 
above that provides the insurer with the choice of duration as to when to 
return interest on the premiums provides the flexibility for the insurer to du-
ration match over a short-to-medium term. In addition, because some capital 
will leave the economy to pay for this insurance, limiting the insurer to a 
five-year duration matching window provides sufficiently short timing that 
it should incentivize insurers to take additional risk to achieve equity re-
turns. As a result, the mandate is that anything beyond the market value of 
the duration-matched assets must be invested in either virtual currencies or 
private placements with entrepreneurial companies so that the funds as best 
approximate private investors making investment in the very entrepreneurial 
enterprises where evidenced bubbles and risk reduction fears exist, yet 
which represent the benefit of the experimental Bitcoin exchanges and 
Kickstarting platforms in the first place. 
A justified counterargument to this proposal exists indicating that the 
proposal encourages additional unnecessary risk-taking by insurers. The 
point, however, is that the capital involved wants to be deployed to that 
risk in the first place by natural persons, most of whom either cannot or 
regulators do not want to engage in such risk taking. Therefore, institu-
tional risk-taking appears to remain generally of less concern to regulators 
than risk taken by middle-class holders of capital.416 As a result, this 
scheme achieves as cost effectively, as briefly, and as economically intru-
sive as possible an econo-legal heterodox framework that employs skeletal 
law and incentive maximization to mesh with a policy goal of protecting 
middle-class investor capital, while still approximating a flow of capital to 
entrepreneurial private equity investments. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although made in the context of international law and economic de-
velopment, Harvard Law School’s David Kennedy indicated that he 
would like to propose a different task for ... law—less a program of ac-
tion than the conveyor of a new sensibility about law and power. A 
sensibility of human freedom and responsibility, of clarity about what 
we do not know, and about the power in our hands, rather than clarity 
about what we know and denial of our power. Of moral action in an ... 
irrational world.417 
This Article attempted to embrace that heterodox philosophy and ap-
ply it to the new technologies of Bitcoin bubbles and crowdfunding con-
straints to help kick-start an unconventional dialogue regarding an econo-
my bogged down via existing and threatened governmental interference 
affecting middle-class entrepreneurs, investors, and jobseekers. 
This Article acknowledged that economic bubbles and the madness of 
crowdfunding items such as tulips to dot-coms have occurred throughout 
history. But this Article also showed the benefit that microfinance has 
played throughout history as well as the benefits of challenging conven-
tional wisdom via a heterodox analytic to be informed by human reality 
applied to present situations, rather than purely by theoretical impossibili-
ties taken as the basis for this nation’s economic policies. This Article de-
scribed the paradox of overregulation of securities in the disruptive crowd-
funding space and the lack of meaningful regulation in the virtual currency 
space to fashion a proposal as close to the heterodox paradigm from which 
the problem was analyzed. 
The proposal involves a minimally invasive statute with no promulgat-
ed rules or regulations thereunder. In addition, the proposal gives signifi-
cant freedom to: (1) risk insurers as to how to structure their enterprises 
(mutualized or demutualized) and invest (duration matching in fixed-
income securities of their choosing combined with a requirement to return 
the currency risk and private equity to the marketplace by more sophisti-
cated investors); and (2) entrepreneurs, who will receive funding via a 
more safeguarded public, a return on premium interest at the prime rate, 
and a requirement that any funds that exceed the duration match on a pre-
sent value basis must be reinvested in virtual currencies and private entre-
preneurial enterprises. 
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Additional debate and gathering of empirical data on these issues 
should occur lest law and policy makers and regulators pass uninformed 
regulations designed to placate potentially fearful constituents and insulate 
them the risky and poor decisions all humans are prone to make at times. 
As Mackay indicated in Extraordinary Popular Delusions: 
Let us not, in the pride of our superior knowledge, turn with contempt 
from the follies of our predecessors. The study of the errors into which 
great minds have fallen in the pursuit of truth can never be uninstruc-
tive. As the man looks back to the days of his childhood and his youth, 
and recalls to his mind the strange notions and false opinions that 
swayed his actions at the time, that he may wonder at them; so should 
society, for its edification, look back to the opinions which governed 
the ages fled.418 
The U.S. should consider the uses, costs and benefits, of potential 
laws, regulations, and policy instruments that can lead to over and under-
regulation of entrepreneurial activity that may spur economic redevelop-
ment, employment opportunities, and general economic growth, a massive 
bubble that leaves many penniless, or an unknown place on the future 
economic spectrum, including at the heterodox barricade.419 
                                                                                                                         
418 Mackay, supra note 1, at 2. 
419 The final few words paraphrase Professor David Kennedy, Law and Development 
Class Lecture at Harvard Law School (Fall Semester, 2008). 
